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STATUTORY POLLUTION CONTROL
IN PENNSYLVANIA
I.

INTRODUCTION

In excess of 133 million tons of aerial garbage are being deposited
in our atmosphere each year.' Simultaneously, pollution of our waterways has become so extreme, that estimated expenditures in excess of 110
billion dollars for water preservation are not exaggerated. 2 Although
federal programs exist to control air and water pollution, it is recognized
that the primary responsibility for environmental protection rests with the
states.3 The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has responded to the pollution control challenge by enacting legislation affecting both air and water
quality. The Air Pollution Control Act 4 establishes the policy of the
Commonwealth with regard to the regulation and enforcement of air pollution. The counterpart of this legislation in the area of water pollution
is the Clean Streams Law. 5 The responsibility for the administration
and enforcement of these two Acts rests with the newly created Department of Environmental Resources. It is the purpose of this Comment to
examine this new Department and the Pennsylvania pollution control
legislation in an effort to determine the effectiveness of the Commonwealth's response to the environmental crisis.
II.

THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES

Apparently realizing the need for a total environmental program at
the state level, the General Assembly of Pennsylvania, following the lead
of the federal government 6 and the State of New Jersey, 7 amended its
Administrative Code8 to create the Department of Environmental Resources 9 (Department). The new Department assumes the pollution control
1. Hearings on S. 780 Before the Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of
the Senate Comm. of Public Works, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 1360 (1967).
2. Hines, Controlling Industrial Pollution: Color the Problem Green, 9 B.C.
IND. & CoM. L. REv. 553, 554 (1968).
3. See Clean Air Act of 1963, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857 et seq. (1965), as amended,
1970 Amendments to the Clean Air Act, 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6910-51;
Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 466(b) (Supp. V, 1970).
4. PA. STAT. tit. 35, §§ 4001-15 (1964), as amended (Supp. 1971).
5. PA. STAT. tit. 35, §§ 691.1-.1001 (Supp. 1971).
6. The administration of the federal government's pollution control programs
was incorporated into a single agency by a plan of reorganization submitted by
President Nixon to Congress on July 9, 1970, becoming effective on Nov. 6, 1970.
Environmental Protection Agency, Reorganization Plan No. 3, 1970 U.S. CODE CONG.
& An. NEWS 2996. See Comment, ParticipationBy States and Individuals Enhances
the National Pollution Control Effort, 16 VILL. L. REV. 827 (1971).
7. Environmental Protection Act of 1970, N.J. REV. STAT. § 13:1B-71 (Supp.
1970-71).
8. PA. STAT. tit. 71, § 61 (Supp. 1971).
9. PA. STAT. tit. 71, § 61 et seq. (Supp. 1971). The Act discussed herein, Act
No. 275, 1970 Sess., Administrative Boards and Commissions - Department of
Environmental Resources - Powers and Duties [hereinafter cited as the Reorganization Act] is also available in PURDON'S PENNSYLVANIA LEGISLATIVE SERVICE, 4 PA.
LEG. SERV. 649 (1970 Sess.).
On the following page is an organizational diagram of the Department of
Environmental Resources, as approved by Governor Milton J. Shapp.
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responsibilities of the Departments of Mines and Mineral Industries ° and
Forests and Waters" which have been abolished. Moreover, numerous
pollution control responsibilities of the Department of Health 2 have also
been assumed. The principle reasons for the creation of the Department
was the necessity for unified control standards, centralized enforcement
efforts and the formulation of coordinated pollution control policies.

4
The Air Pollution Control Act' 3 and the Clean Streams Law,'

previously administered by the Department of Health and its affiliated
agencies, the Air Pollution Commission and the Sanitary Water Board,
are now enforced by the Department. 5 The Reorganization Act expressly abolishes the Air Pollution Commission and the Sanitary Water
Board,' 6 assigning their functions to the new Department and its affiliated
agencies, the Environmental Quality Board' 7 and the Environmental
Hearing Board.' 8
The Environmental Quality Board is empowered to enact rules and
regulations for the environmental well-being of the Commonwealth and
its citizens.' 9 It is expected that any regulations promulgated by the
Quality Board will reflect consideration of the total environmental pollution control problem, rather than merely a particular segment thereof as
previously experienced under separate agency administration. Until the
Quality Board promulgates new air and water pollution control regulations, however, those adopted by the now defunct Air Pollution Commission and Sanitary Water Board will carry forward as the regulations of
20
the Department.
It is the function of the Environmental Hearing Board to consider
all appeals from determinations made by the Department. 2' The Hearing
Board is authorized to employ hearing examiners at such various locations
as are necessary in the exercise of this function. 22 The review of Department determinations by the new Hearing Board supplants the review pre10. PA. STAT. tit. 71, § 510-1(2) (Supp. 1971).

11.
12.

13.

PA.
PA.
PA.
PA.
PA.
PA.
PA.

STAT. tit. 71, § 510-1(1) (Supp. 1971).
STAT. tit. 71, § 510-1(6-21) (Supp. 1971).
STAT. tit. 35, §§ 4001-15 (1964), as amended (Supp. 1971).
STAT. tit. 35, §§ 691.1-.1001 (Supp. 1971).
STAT. tit. 71, § 510-1(16), (20) (Supp. 1971).
STAT. tit. 71, § 510--103(a) (Supp. 1971).
STAT. tit. 71, § 180-1 (Supp. 1971). The Environmental

14.
15.
16.
17.
Quality Board
will consist of the Secretaries of the Department of Environmental Resources (who
will chair the Board), Health, Commerce, Transportation, Agriculture, Labor and
Industry, Community Affairs; the Executive Directors of the Game Commission and
the Fish Commission; the Chairman of the Public Utilities Commission; the Executive Director of the State Planning Board; the Executive Director of the Pennsylvania
Historical and Museum Commission; five members of the Citizens Advisory Council
and four members of the General Assembly. Id.
18. PA. STAT. tit. 71, § 180-2 (Supp. 1971). The Environmental Hearing Board
consists of three members, each "learned in the law." Id.
19. PA. STAT. tit. 71, § 510-20(b) (Supp. 1971).
20. PA. STAT. tit. 71, § 510-20(c) (Supp. 1971).
21. PA. STAT. tit. 71, § 510-21(a) (Supp. 1971).
22. PA. STAT. tit. 71, § 510-21(f) (Supp. 1971).
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viously conducted by the Air Pollution Commission and the Sanitary Water
Board under the Air Pollution Control Act and the Clean Streams Law.
The Reorganization Act also provides for a Citizens Advisory Council,
composed of nineteen members - the Secretary of the Department, six
members appointed by the Governor, six appointed by the President
Pro-Tempore of the Senate and six appointed by the Speaker of the
House - which will review the current environmental laws of the Commonwealth and recommend modification, revision, and codification of
these laws.

23

Although the Department of Environmental Resources will theoretically streamline the Commonwealth's pollution control programs, there
will necessarily exist within the Department separate bureaus responsible
for administering the particular pollution programs previously exercised
by other departments.2 4 Whether this will result in a conglomerate department too burdensome to operate efficiently is a question open to speculation
25
at the present time.
III.

AIR POLLUTION

A.

CONTROL

Introduction

The purpose of this section of the Comment is to examine the air
pollution policies of the Commonwealth, the regulations adopted pursuant
to the Commonwealth's air pollution laws, the investigation and issuance
of complaints upon discovery of regulatory violations, and the process
whereby such complaints result in administrative abatement orders. The
enforcement of administrative orders, penalties for statutory violations,
and the judicial review of such orders will also be considered.
B.

Policy

The initial attempt by the Pennsylvania General Assembly to combat
the expanding problem of air pollution resulted in the Air Pollution Control Act of 1960.21 The statutory scheme of the 1960 Act rested upon a
"maximum of cooperation and conciliation among all the parties con23. PA. STAT. tit. 71, § 510-22(a-d) (Supp. 1971).
24. The "bureaus" identified in the proposed organizational structure of the
Department, note 9 supra, are to administer those specific pollution control programs,
i.e., air, water, and mines, forests, etc., that will be carried forward from the previous
departments. However, functional considerations will ultimately determine the final
programs to be administered by each specific bureau. Conversation with Edward M.
Seladones, Department of Environmental Resources, April 15, 1971.
25. Dr. Maurice K. Goddard, as of this writing the temporary Secretary of the
Department of Environmental Resources, stated that the Department is too unwieldy
and that the Commonwealth's environmental control programs should remain within
already existing state agencies. Philadelphia Inquirer, Feb. 7, 1971, § 2, at 9, col. 1.
26. PA. STAT. tit. 35, §§ 4001-15 (1964), as amended (Supp. 1971). Prior to
enactment of the Air Pollution Control Act of 1960, air pollution abatement efforts
were carried out under the Commonwealth's general health laws, PA. STAT. tit. 71,
§ 1403 (1962), which gave the Secretary of Health the authority to abate nuisances
detrimental to the public health. PA. STAT. tit. 71, § 1404 (1962).
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cerned. ' '2 7 In 1966 and 1968 the General Assembly enacted substantial
amendments to the 1960 Act. Of significant importance is the amended
declaration of policy, which states:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to protect the air resources of the Commonwealth to the
degree necessary for the (i) protection of public health, safety and
well-being of its citizens; (ii) prevention of injury to plant and animal
life and to property; (iii) protection of the comfort and convenience
of the public and the protection of the recreational resources of the
Commonwealth; and (iv) development,
attraction and expansion of
28
industry, commerce and agriculture.
The amended declaration of policy reflects a change in priority from
the initial declaration contained in the 1960 Act. 29 The focus of the original declaration was to maintain the state's air resources at a "reasonable
degree of purity" while not unreasonably obstructing business and industry, by means "technically feasible and economically reasonable"; whereas
the policy of the amended declaration stresses the protection of the air
resources of the Commonwealth to the degree necessary for the protection
of the public health, prevention of injury to plant and animal life, protection of the public comfort and convenience and attraction of industry,
commerce and agriculture, in that order. 30 Moreover, while the initial
policy declaration was phrased negatively, such that the attainment of air
quality should not unreasonably obstruct business, industry and agricultural
development, the amended policy declaration is phrased positively, i.e.,
protection of the air resources to the degree necessary to encourage in31
dustrial, business, and agricultural growth and attraction.
The definition of "air pollution" was also amended so that it currently includes:
27.

PA. STAT.

tit. 35, § 4002 (1964).

The entire text of the original declaration

of policy states as follows:
It is hereby determined and declared to be the policy of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania to maintain such a reasonable degree of purity of the air resources
of the Commonwealth as shall be technically feasible, economically reasonable,
and necessary for the protection of the normal health, the general welfare and
the property of the people of the Commonwealth. The measures for the accomplishment of this purpose shall not unreasonably obstruct the attraction, development and expansion of business, industry and commerce within the Commonwealth,
but shall be technically feasible and economically reasonable. The program for
the control of air pollution under this act shall be undertaken in a progressive
manner, and each of its successive objectives shall be sought to be accomplished
by a maximum of cooperation and conciliation among all the parties concerned.
All powers herein conferred upon the Department of Health, the Air Pollution
Commission, or any Regional Air Pollution Control Association, and all powers
herein reserved to any political subdivision shall be exercised solely to effectuate
the policy declared in this section.
28. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 4002 (Supp. 1971) (emphasis added).
29. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 4002 (1964).
30. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 4002 (Supp. 1971).
31. The specific activities subject to development, attraction and expansion lend
credence to such an interpretation. Agricultural activities by necessity require the
absence of air contaminants. Businesses, meaning non-industrial activities, would certainly be attracted to a pollution free environment. Industries admittedly are more
conscious of the cost of pollution control and thus may be reluctant to move to areas
which require pollution control devices.
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[T]he presence in the outdoor atmosphere of any form of contaminant . . . inimical or which may be inimical to the public health,

safety, or welfare, or which is, or may be injurious to human, plant
interferes with
or animal life, or to property, or which unreasonably
32
the comfortable enjoyment of life or property.
Focusing again on the protection of air quality rather than maintenance, the amended definition encompasses air contaminants which may
have a deleterious affect upon health or property. It also extends the
coverage of the Act to air contaminants not specifically covered by any
regulations.

C. Rules and Regulations
The responsibility for developing a master environmental plan for
the Commonwealth rests with the Environmental Quality Board.3 3 With
respect to the Air Pollution Control Act, the Quality Board is to assume
one of the two major functions of the now-dissolved Air Pollution Commission; namely the adoption of rules and regulations pertaining to air
pollution control for the Commonwealth and its localized regions.3 4 However, as noted previously,3 5 until such new regulations are promulgated
by the Quality Board, those promulgated by the Air Pollution Commission
remain effective.3 6 It is therefore appropriate to determine whether the
existing regulations are adequate or whether the Quality Board should
32. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 4003(5) (Supp. 1971). The entire text of the definition
states:
"Air Pollution." The presence in the outdoor atmosphere of any form of contaminant including but not limited to the discharging from stacks, chimneys,
openings, buildings, structures, open fires, vehicles, processes, or any other source
of any smoke, soot, fly ash, dust, cinders, dirt, noxious or obnoxious acids, fumes,
oxides, gases, vapors, odors, toxic or radioactive substances, waste, or any other
matter in such place, manner, or concentration inimical or which may be inimical
to the public health, safety or welfare or which is, or may be injurious to human,
plant or animal life, or to propetry, or which unreasonably interferes with the
comfortable enjoyment of life or property.
Air pollution was defined in the 1960 Act as:
The presence in the outdoor atmosphere of one or more air contaminants in
sufficient quantity and of such characteristics and duration which is injurious to
human, plant or animal life, or to property, or which unreasonably interferes
with the comfortable enjoyment of life and property throughout the Commonwealth or throughout such areas of the Commonwealth as shall be affected thereby.
PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 4003(5) (1964). The 1960 Act defines an air contaminant to be
smoke, dust, fume, gas, odor, mist, vapor, pollen, or any combination thereof. PA.
STAT. tit. 35, § 4003(4) (1964).
33. PA. STAT. tit. 71, § 510--20(a) (Supp. 1971).
34. PA. STAT. tit. 71, § 510-20(c) (Supp. 1971). For the authority of the Air
Pollution Commission to adopt rules and regulations, see Air Pollution Control Act,
PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 4005f(2) (1964). The Air Pollution Control Act authorized the
Air Pollution Commission to partition the Commonwealth into localized regions,
apparently for the purpose of efficient administration. At present there are six air
pollution control regions encompassing all of the counties within the Commonwealth.
See Comment, Local Government Action In The Control Of Environmental Pollution
In The Commonwealth Of Pennsylvania, 16 VILL. L. Rav. 895, 896 n.ll (1971).
35. See note 20 and accompanying text supra.
36. PA. STAT. tit. 71, § 510-20(c) (Supp. 1971).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol16/iss5/4

6

Paul and Shepard: Statutory Pollution Control in Pennsylvania
MAY

1971]

COMMENTS

establish new regulations. The six regulations presently in effect which
affect the quality of air within the Commonwealth will be consideredY7
1.

Coal Refuse and Disposal Areas38

Regulation I -

The initial regulation adopted in 1962 was the result of a study which
indicated that burning coal refuse and disposal areas constituted one of
the most serious air pollution problems of the Commonwealth. In order
to control burning coal refuse disposal areas a permit system was adopted
together with specific procedures to be followed in the operation of such
areas. These procedures are designed to minimize the possibility of ignition of the coal areas.
2.

Regulation II

-

Open Burning Operations39

This regulation prohibits open burning operations 40 with respect to

garbage, 4 1 rubbish, 42 trade waste43 and salvage operations 44 which cause

air pollution. The standard for determining the existence of air pollution
caused by open burning is established by evidence of smoke 45 or emission
density in excess of the degree permitted, as determined by an apparatus
known as the Ringelmann Smoke Chart.46 Evidence of unreasonable
37. The regulations [hereinafter referred to as Reg. I to VI], all adopted by the
dissolved Air Pollution Commission, now constitute the regulations of the Department of Environmental Resources. Copies of the Regulations are available from the
Department of Environmental Resources, Bureau of Air Pollution Control, P.O. Box
2351, Harrisburg, Pa. 17120.
38. Reg. I, To Prevent and Control Air Pollution From Coal Refuse Disposal
Areas, May 29, 1962, as amended, June 27, 1967.
39. Reg. II, To Control Air Pollution From Open Burning Operations, May 29,
1962, as amended, June 27, 1967.
40. Reg. II, § 1.1(7) defines "open burning" as:
Any unenclosed fire wherein air contaminants are emitted into the open air, and
are not directed through a flue.
41. Reg. II, § 1.1(1) defines "garbage" as:
All putrescible animal and vegetable matter resulting from the handling, preparation, cooking and consumption of food.
42. Reg. II, § 1.1(2) defines "rubbish" as:
Solids not considered to be highly flammable or explosive including but not limited
to rags, old clothes, leather, rubber, carpets, wood ... and other similar materials.
43. Reg. II, § 1.1(3) defines "trade waste" as:
All solid or liquid material or rubbish resulting from construction, building operations, or the prosecution of any business, trade or industry including, but not
limited to, plastic products, cartons, paint, grease, oil and other petroleum
products . . . provided however that trade waste shall not include any coal refuse
associated with the mining and preparation of coal.
44. Reg. II, § 1.1 (5) defines "salvage operations" as:
Any business, trade or industry engaged in whole or in part in salvaging or reclaiming any product or material, including, but not limited to, metals, chemicals,
shipping containers or drums.
45. Reg. II, § 1.1(9) defines "smoke" as:
Small gas-borne particles resulting from incomplete combustion, consisting predominantly of carbon and other combustible material, and present in sufficient
quantity to be observable.
46. This system tests emissions by visual method. Five test cards are generally
employed with black lines or "cross hatchings" impressed upon a white background.
The ratio of black lines to white background increases on a scale from zero to five.
The observer notes the number of the card which most nearly corresponds to the color
of the smoke. The higher the number, the greater the density. Comparisons are made
at time intervals and give an approximate measure of the density of the smoke from
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interference with the enjoyment of one's property, damage to vegetation
or property, or deleterious effect upon human or animal life may also be
the basis for an air pollution violation.
3.

Regulation III - Approval of Construction or Modification of Air Contamination Sources and Permits To Operate
47
Such Sources

Prior to the construction of new facilities, or the modification of
established facilities by the installation of air cleaning devices, approval
by the Department in the form of a permit is required. Approval is conditioned upon submission of specific data by the applicant, "sufficient in
scope to allow an engineering evaluation to be made to determine whether
or not the air contamination source will cause or contribute to the creation
of air pollution. ' 48 To assist the applicant, the regulation provides for
engineering guides to be prepared by the Department indicating design
49
criteria for various air contamination sources.
The responsibility for approving applications and issuing the requisite
permit now rests with the Department of Environmental Resources.
Denial, revocation or suspension of a permit by the Department entitles
the operator to a hearing before the Environmental Hearing Board. The
Hearing Board reviews the Department's action and renders a decision
affirming, modifying or reversing the Department.5 ° Regulation III is
applicable only to the air contamination sources specified in the Engineering Guides. 5 ' Furthermore, it is limited in its effect since it is not applicable to facilities constructed prior to 1962 or to facilities which have
not experienced a modification since that time.5 2 These facilities must be
inspected individually to ascertain the need for pollution control devices.
4.

From
Regulation IV - Control of Local Air Polution
53
Sources of Particulate and Gaseous Emissions

Local air pollution is defined by this regulation as "[a]ir pollution in
a specific area readily discernible as being caused by a single source or
the particular source. See Comment, Air Pollution: Causes, Sources and Abatement,
1968 WASH. U.L.Q. 205, 221.
47. Reg. III, For the Prevention and Control of Air Pollution by Requiring Plan
Approval Prior to the Construction or Modification of Air Contamination Sources and
a Permit for the Operation of Air Contamination Sources, October 22, 1962, as
amended, June 27, 1967, July 17, 1969.
48. Reg. III, § 1.3(1).
49. Engineering guides were subsequently approved and adopted for the following
classes of sources: Boilers, incinerators, blacktop plants, cupulas, coke ovens, charcoal
kilns, and nuclear reactors. Department engineers review all applications to determine compatibility with the engineering guides. See Reg. III, Engineering Guides,
October 22, 1962, et seq.
50. Reg. III, § 1.3(3).
51. Reg. III, § 1.2.
52. Reg. III, § 1.3(1).
53. Reg. IV, To Control Local Air Pollution From Sources of Particulate or
Gaseous Matter Emissions, March 15, 1966, as amended, December 19, 1969.
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a group of sources in close proximity to each other. 15 4 Standard emission
rates for particulate matter 5 and fugitive dust 56 are designated. Compliance with the established emission rates is determined by the concentration of the pollutant at ground level at any point outside the polluter's
property, rather than at a point where the pollutant is emitted from the
stack and enters the atmosphere. 5 Thus, the higher the stack, the greater
is the dispersion of the pollutant into the atmosphere with a consequent
reduction of ground level concentration. While effective stack height is
helpful in resolving local air pollution problems, it is suggested that such
an approach has no effect upon area-wide pollution problems.
5.

Regulation V

-

Area (Air Basin) Air Pollution58

To confront the problem of air pollution which emanates from several
sources, as opposed to the local air pollution problem, specifically designated areas of the Commonwealth were established as air basins. The
criteria for designating these basins included: (1) the density and the
characteristics of the air pollution sources; (2) the occurrences of air
pollution problems; and (3) various topographical and meteorological
factors. 59 These criteria also served as the basis for classifying each air
basin.6 0 Potential emission rates, or the total weight rate of particulate
emissions when the air contaminant source operates at maximum capacity,
are combined graphically with the area's classification, to determine a
maximum emission rate for that area air basin. 61
6.

Regulation VI -

Reporting of Air Contamination Sources62

The purpose of this regulation is to register new as well as existing
stationary sources of air contaminants. The information received from
these reports is to be used to establish a state-wide emission inventory.
54. Reg. IV, § 1.1(5).
55. Reg. IV, § 1.1(7) defines "particulate matter" as:
Discrete particles of liquid (except uncombined water) and/or solid matter which
is often, but not always, suspended in air or other gases at atmospheric temperature and pressure.
56. Reg. IV, § 1.1(3) defines "fugitive dust" as:
Solid airborne particulate matter emitting at or near ground level from any
source other than a flue.
57. Reg. IV, § 1.3(2), (3).
58. Reg. V, To Control Area (Air-Basin) Air Pollution, January 28, 1969, as
amended, December 19, 1969.
59. The dissolved Air Pollution Commission established eleven air basins:
1. Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton
7. Reading
2. Beaver Valley
8. Scranton-Wilkes-Barre
3. Erie
9. Southeast Pennsylvania
4. Harrisburg
10. York
5. Johnstown
11. Monongahela Valley
6. Lancaster
Each basin encompasses designated municipalities and cities. The eleven air
basins are, of course, located within the six air pollution control regions. See PA.
STAT. tit. 35, § 4005f(2) (1964). See also Comment, supra note 34, at 896.
60. The basins presently are classified as either C or D basins. Reg. V, § 1.3.
61. Reg. V, § 1.1(9).
62. Reg. VI, For Reporting of Air Contamination Sources, July 17, 1969.
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As of this writing, it is reported that approximately twenty thousand
63
registration forms have been issued throughout the Commonwealth.
In 1969, the Air Pollution Commission (now the Department)
adopted Ambient Air Quality Standards,6 4 which were, in effect, objective goals to be reached in order to assure the quality of the air throughout the Commonwealth. These standards will be used by the Department
to evaluate air pollution studies of various communities and to determine
the need for new regulations to achieve these objectives.
In evaluating the regulations it is well to bear in mind that the extent
of their enforcement, or the lack thereof, may play a substantial part in
determining their effectiveness. Hence, a regulation may be adequate to
solve the problem but due to manpower and financial shortages its effectiveness may be so curtailed as to create the impression that the regulation itself is insufficient. Nevertheless, there are some who feel that the
current regulations do not go far enough to prevent harmful properties
from entering the atmosphere, irrespective of the degree of enforcement.
They feel that there is an immediate need for regulations setting emission limits for sulphur oxides, nitrogen oxides and lead. 65 The problem
encountered when attempting to limit these gaseous emissions is to determine what rate of emission will cause a harmful result. Until this can
be exhibited with some degree of certainty, any rate established will be
subject to administrative as well as judicial attack. It is necessary, therefore, that the new Department undertake intensive studies of the effects
of the above mentioned gaseous emissions and act quickly in establishing
at least minimal emission rates as soon as sufficient information is available. It is further suggested that the Department undertake an evaluation
of the present enforcement measures to determine whether the existing
regulations are being sufficiently enforced to be effective. 66
D.

Investigation and Initiation of Complaints

The Department of Environmental Resources is responsible for the

enforcement of the regulatory standards adopted by the Quality Board.
The Air Pollution Control Act authorizes the Department to investigate
all suspected violations of the regulations. 67 Investigations are generally
conducted by control engineers staffing the six regional offices or the
offices located within the eleven air basins. Although systematic investi63. Report of Mr. Victor H. Sussman, former Director, Bureau of Air Pollution

Control (now within the Department of Environmental Resources), Pennsylvania
Department of Health, to the Pennsylvania Environmental Law Enforcement Workshop, held at Hershey, Pa., January 13-14, 1971. Transcript on file at Villanova
Law Review office.
64. Pennsylvania Ambient Air Quality Standards, Air Pollution Commission
(now the Department of Environmental Resources), October 20, 1969.
65. Interview with Mr. Steven Wasko, Air Pollution Control Engineer for
Region II, Bethlehem, Pa., Jan. 8, 1971. Recording on file at Villanova Law Review
office.
66. See note 65 and accompanying text supra; see also p. 853 supra.
67. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 4004(1) (1964).
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gation conducted on a plant by plant, or industry by industry basis is preferred by those responsible for enforcement, the lack of adequate personnel
has limited the investigation of possible air contamination sources to those
which are the most obvious, i.e., the large industries.68
Upon discovering a violation of a regulatory standard, the Department is authorized to issue a complaint to the alleged polluter.6 9 Similarly,
private parties may initiate a complaint to the Department. 70 However,
while a private individual may quite easily recognize a violation of a
smoke density or open burning regulation, his ability to recognize violations of the regulations pertaining to particulate emission rates is severely
limited since, for the most part, they are discoverable only by the use of
technical apparatus operated by experienced Department control engineers.
Regardless of who initiates the complaint, it is then forwarded to a Regional
Air Pollution Control Association (Association) located in the region
where the alleged violation occurred.7 1 Upon receipt of a complaint from
the Department, the Association is allotted three months to undertake an
assessment of the complaint, and attempt, through the "use of a maximum
of conference, conciliation and persuasion, to abate, control, reduce or
prevent air pollution within the region pursuant to the rules and regulations of the [Environmental Quality Board]."72
The Associations were quite effective prior to the enactment of the
current regulations, when, due to the absence of definite standards, cooperation and conciliation between the alleged polluter and the state authority
were most necessary. However, the promulgation of regulatory standards
should now make each industry aware of the objective pollution criteria
applicable to its operations and therefore mark the demise of alleged unknowing emission of pollution. Moreover, although the Air Pollution
Control Act provides that each Association is to meet at least four times
per year, 73 there are indications that this has not been the case.7 4 Since
68. The Chief Air Pollution Control Engineer for Region I, which encompasses
the counties of Bucks, Montgomery, Chester, Delaware and Philadelphia, reported
that ten per cent of the industries in the region have been formally investigated. When

considered with the fact that the number of engineers assigned to Region I is six, the
results are not less than could be expected. Interview with Mr. Frank J. Willard, Jr.,
Chief Air Pollution Control Engineer for Region I, in Norristown, Pa., on January 6,
1971. Recording on file at Villanova Law Review office.
69. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 4004(3) (Supp. 1971).
70. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 4004(3) (Supp. 1971), declares that the Department shall
have the power and duty to "[r]eceive and initiate complaints." While the Air Pollution Control Act does not specifically authorize private complaints, it is submitted
that such action is appropriate and available.
71. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 4004(3) (Supp. 1971). It has previously been stated that
the Commonwealth is divided into six air pollution control regions; see note 34 supra.
Operating within each region is a Regional Air Pollution Control Association. See
notes 72-75 and accompanying text infra for an examination of the Regional Associations and their responsibilities.
72. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 4006b(3) (Supp. 1971).
73. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 4006b(6) (Supp. 1971).
74. A regional control engineer of the Department of Environmental Resources
reported that the Association within his region had not called a meeting during a
seven month period. Although complaints were filed and prepared, he was forced to
wait until the Association called the meeting before bringing forward the complaints.
Interview, supra note 65.
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such a meeting is necessary before action may be taken on a complaint,
followed by a maximum of three months wherein the Association may
attempt to rectify the matter, it is conceivable that administrative abatement activity will not be taken for six months or more after the complaint
has been filed with the Department. The Association's importance and
the factor of delay become further suspect when one considers that the
Association is required to return the matter to the Department for further
action if compliance is not effected within the prescribed time.7 5 Hence,
the Department determines what corrective action is necessary irrespective of the Association's determinations.
E.

Abatement Orders and Administrative Review

If the Department uncovers a violation it is authorized to "[i]ssue
orders to any person causing air pollution," and may stipulate in the order
the time within which compliance is to be effected. 76 Orders are normally
issued following consultation among the regional control engineers and
the Department in Harrisburg. The authority of the Department to issue
abatement orders results from an amendment to the Air Pollution Control
Act adopted in 1968. Prior to the amendment, the issuance of an abatement order was conditioned upon a full hearing and adjudication subject
to the provisions of the Administrative Agency Law. 7"

The 1968 amend-

ment removed this impediment by authorizing the Department to issue
abatement orders which granted an aggrieved party the right to appeal
such order to the Environmental Hearing Board - previously the Air
Pollution Commission.78 The effectiveness of this change becomes immediately apparent when one recognizes that prior to the amendment,
between 1960 and 1968, only 70 orders were issued, while after the
amendment became effective, between June 12, 1968 and December 31,
1970 a total of 275 orders had been issued. 79 To fill the void occasioned
by the lack of a hearing prior to the issuance of the abatement order, the
Air Pollution Control Act provides a statutory right of appeal from an
order issued by the Department.8 0 The administrative body authorized
to determine all such appeals from Department orders is the Environmental Hearing Board."'

75.
76.

While the pertinent sections of the Reorganiza-

tit. 35, § 4006b(3) (Supp. 1971).
tit. 35, § 4004(4.1) (Supp. 1971).
77. See Air Pollution Control Act of 1960, PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 4005(f) (5), (7)
(1964). The original Act provided that abatement orders issue from the Air Pollution
Commission rather than from the Department, and that such order be issued only
after a full hearing before the Air Pollution Commission. Complaints subject to review
by the Regional Air Pollution Commission would move directly to the Air Pollution
Commission for adjudication. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 4006(b) (3) (1964).
78. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 4004(4.1) (Supp. 1971).
79. Letter received from Mr. James K. Hambright, Director, Division of Abatement and Compliance, Bureau of Air Pollution Control, Department of Health, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, dated January 18, 1971, on file at Villanova Law Review
office. This Bureau is now under the direction of the Department of Environmental
Resources. PA. STAT. tit. 71, § 510--1(16) (Supp. 1971).
80. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 4004(4.1) (Supp. 1971).
81. PA. STAT. tit. 71, § 510-21(a) (Supp. 1971).
PA. STAT.
PA. STAT.
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tion Acts2 describing the duties and responsibilities of the Environmental
Hearing Board do not specify the time limit for perfecting appeals, 83 the
84
thirty day requirement prescribed in the Air Pollution Control Act
will probably be maintained by the Hearing Board.
All determinations of the Hearing Board are in the form of an adjudication subject to the provisions of the Administrative Agency Law."5
Thus the appealing party must be given notice of the hearing and be
afforded an opportunity to be heard.86 Appeals taken to the Hearing
87
Board do not automatically stay enforcement of the administrative order
as existed under the Air Pollution Control Act which provided that a
perfected appeal would hold an order in abeyance pending its adjudication.8 8 In this manner the right to be heard is provided for, and, more
significantly, the pollution is being abated quickly rather than continuing
while the sometimes slow administrative process determines the merits.
The Air Pollution Control Act provides for judicial review of administrative determinations.8 9 While the Reorganization Act is silent as to this
point, the controlling sections of the Air Pollution Control Act and the
Administrative Agency Law9" presume the availability of judicial review.
Appeals from adjudications of the Hearing Board are reviewable by the
recently created Commonwealth Court.91
F.

Sanctions

Section 8 of the amended Air Pollution Control Act defines "unlawful
conduct" as failure to comply with the rules and regulations of the Commission (now the Environmental Quality Board) or any order of the
Department. 2 The Act authorizes corresponding approaches to contend
82.

PA. STAT. tit. 71, § 510-21(a-g) (Supp. 1971).
83. PA. STAT. tit. 71, § 510-21(e) (Supp. 1971), provides that the Environmental
Quality Board shall determine its own rules for the taking of appeals to the Environmental Hearing Board, including time limits within which such appeals may be
perfected.
84. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 4004(4.1) (Supp. 1971).
85. PA. STAT. tit. 71, § 1710.1 et seq. (1962).
86. PA. STAT. tit. 71, § 1710.31 (1962). See Commonwealth v. Heindel, 42 Pa.
D. & C.2d 205 (York County C.P. 1967).
87. PA. STAT. tit. 71, § 510-21(d) (Supp. 1971).
88. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 4004(4.1) (Supp. 1971).
89. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 4005(g) (1964), as amended, PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 4005(d)(5) (Supp. 1971).
90. PA. STAT. tit. 71, § 1710.41 (1962). See also Man O'War Racing Ass'n v.
State Horse Racing Comm'n, 433 Pa. 432, 250 A.2d 172 (1969).
91. PA. STAT. tit. 17, § 211.14(a), repealed the jurisdiction of the Dauphin County
Court of Common Pleas as the proper court for administrative agency appeals; it was
replaced by the newly established Commonwealth Court in 1970. PA. STAT. tit. 17,
§ 211.14(d) (Supp. 1971).
92. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 4008 (Supp. 1971). The entire text reads as follows:
It shall be unlawful to fail to comply with any rule or regulation or to fail
to comply with any order of the department, to violate or to assist in the violation
of any of the provisions of this act or rules and regulations adopted hereunder,
or to in any manner hinder, obstruct, delay, resist, prevent or in any way interfere or attempt to interfere with the department or its personnel in the performance of any duty hereunder, or refuse to permit such personnel to perform their
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with unlawful conduct. The Department may institute prosecution under
the Act 93 or "[i]nstitute in a court of competent jurisdiction proceedings
to compel compliance with an order of the Department from which there
'9 4
has been no appeal or which has been sustained on appeal.
The provisions of the Act remain unclear, however, as to how compliance with a Department order may be compelled. Although the Act
authorizes the Department to initiate actions to compel compliance, the
pertinent section of the Act which permits application for injunctive relief
premises such application upon "violations of this act." 95 The question
presented is whether non-compliance with a Department order alone is
a violation of the Act or must the Department first prove a prima facie
violation of one of the sections of the Act. The Act seemingly differentiates between violations of the provisions of the act and failure to comply
with an order of the Department." Whether the vagueness is due to
faulty draftsmanship or is intentional, the apparent distinction is unfortunate. If injunctive relief for non-compliance with Departmental
orders resulting from regulatory violations is denied, and it appears that
under section 10 such relief will not be available, then the Act's enforce97
ment machinery is effectively limited.
It may be possible, however, to obtain injunctive relief through another section of the Air Pollution Control Act. Section 11 authorizes the
Department, upon the approval of the Attorney General, to petition for
injunctive relief to abate a health nuisance, even though such nuisance
is subject to regulation by the Department. 98 Therefore, it would be
duty by refusing them, after proper identification or presentatiolp of a written
order of the department, entrance at reasonable hours to any premises.
93. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 4004(7) (Supp. 1971).

94.

PA. STAT.

tit. 35, § 4004(5) (Supp. 1971).

95. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 4010(a) (Supp. 1971). The entire section reads:
In addition to any other remedies provided for in this act, the department may
request the Attorney General to petition the court of common pleas in the county
in which the defendant resides or has his place of business for an injunction to
restrain all violations of this act. (emphasis added)
The Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County is conferred with
equitable jurisdiction to prevent or restrain "the commission or continuance of acts
contrary to law and prejudicial to the interests of the community or the rights of
individuals." PA. STAT. tit. 17, § 282V (1962). The equitable jurisdiction of the
Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas was extended to every common pleas
court throughout the Commonwealth. PA. STAT. tit. 17, § 283 (1962).
96. The Milk Marketing Law, PA. STAT. tit. 31, § 700j-1004 (Supp. 1971),
contains provisions similar to section 10 of the Air Pollution Control Act and also
distinguishes between violations of the Milk Marketing Law and non-compliance with
orders of the Milk Marketing Board. However, unlike the Air Pollution Control
Act, injunctive relief is expressly provided for violations of either. See also Comment,
Air Pollution: The Problem and the Legislative and Administrative Responses of
the United States, Pennsylvania and Allegheny County, 30 U. PITT. L. REv. 633,
661 n.88 (1969).
97. Another view would be to acknowledge that regulations adopted according
to statutory procedure have the force and effect of law, thus, making the regulations
affecting the enforcement of the Air Pollution Control Act part of that Act. Therefore, a violation of the Act should not be distinguished from failure to comply with
an order which was issued because of a violation of those regulations.
98. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 4011 (Supp. 1971). This section was amended in 1966,
probably as the result of the decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Glen Alden Corp., 418 Pa. 57, 210 A.2d 256 (1965), which held that, absent
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possible to allege the existence of a health nuisance resulting from the
failure to comply with the Department's order which had been issued in
response to a violation of one or more of the regulations thus, constituting
"air pollution" within the statutory definition.9 9 Non-compliance with an
order would necessarily connote the continuance of a regulatory violation
which could be a hazard to health, and therefore a nuisance.
The Air Pollution Control Act also provides penal sanctions for unlawful conduct. Summary offenses, for violations of the rules and regulations or failure to comply with an order of the Department, result in
fines ranging from $100 to $500 and jail sentences up to a maximum of
thirty days for default in the payment of the fine. Conviction of a third
or subsequent offense constitutes a misdemeanor with corresponding fines
from $500 to $1000 and/or imprisonment for one year. 100 Thus, the
Department may avail itself of alternate penal sanctions for abating air
pollution. It may: (1) proceed to abate a violation of regulatory standards
through its order issuing authority and later prosecute failure to comply
with the order; or (2) it may directly prosecute violations of the regulations.
IV.

THE CLEAN STREAMS LAW

A.

Introduction

The purpose of this section of this Comment is to examine the policies
of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania toward the problem of water pollution. The Clean Streams Law' 01 and the rules and regulations promulgated pursuant thereto 0 2 will be examined in detail to ascertain whether
the present approach is adequate to confront the problem. Special emphasis
will be directed to enumerating those activities which constitute violations
a showing of irreparable harm or inadequacy of a statutory remedy, the court's equity
jurisdiction was removed by the enactment of the Air Pollution Control Act.
99. Unlike the Clean Streams Law, PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 691.401 (Supp. 1971),
which statutorily designates certain conduct as constituting a public nuisance, the
Department, in order to obtain injunctive relief under section 11 of the Air Pollution
Control Act must prove the existence of a public nuisance. Thus, the Department

must show that violation of a regulation subjects the public to injury or the possibility
of injury to health and that a failure to comply with the order will result in a continuing health hazard. For a thorough discussion of nuisance, see Comment, The
Use of Private Actions To Control Environmental Pollution in Pennsylvania, 16
VILL. L. REV. 920 (1971). Under the Pennsylvania Clean Streams Law, PA. STAT.
tit. 35, § 691.601 (Supp. 1970), injunctive relief is specifically permitted when necessary to obtain compliance with administrative orders. A similar approach is employed
under the New Jersey Air Pollution Control Act providing for injunctive relief to
prohibit and prevent violations of an order issued by the Department of Environmental
Protection. N.J. REV. STAT. § 26:2C-19 (Supp. 1970).
100. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 4009(a), (b), as amended (Supp. 1971).
101. PA. STAT. tit. 35, §§ 691.1 et seq. (Supp. 1971).
102. RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE SANITARY WATER BOARD, COMMONWEALTH
OF PENNSYLVANIA, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH (1970) [hereinafter cited as RULES AND
REGULATIONS]. With the reorganization of the administration of the pollution control
laws, see pp. 851-54 supra, the rules and regulations will be promulgated by the
Quality Board. However, until the Board takes action, the rules and regulations
of the now-abolished Sanitary Water Board will remain in effect. PA. STAT. tit. 35,
§ 691.608 (1964).
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of the Act' 0 3 and the judicial and administrative avenues available to the
Commonwealth to abate such violations. Some consideration will also be
given to the importance of controlling future pollution through planning.
B.
1.

Municipal Sewage

Sewage Pollution

Municipal sewage has long been one of the primary causes of the
pollution of the waters of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. 10 4 Municipalities empty millions of gallons of organic wastes into streams to a
point where the matter cannot be assimilated by the stream and thereby
purified by natural means. A watercourse under these conditions merely
acts as a waste conduit causing the loss of the use of the stream for any
beneficial or aesthetic purpose and a danger to the health of the downstream communities. 10 5 In response to the obvious dangers that are
presented by this situation, the Clean Streams Law' 0 6 declares that the
discharge of sewage' 0 7 which causes or contributes to the pollution of
103. The discharge of industrial wastes, sewage or any substance which causes
or contributes to the pollution of a watercourse is declared to be a public nuisance.
PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 691.3 (Supp. 1971). This statement which articulates the common
law premise, has been recognized since the case of Howell v. McCoy, 3 Rawle 256
(Pa. 1832), that the Commonwealth has a right and duty to abate pollution of a
stream when the public use is affected, or a menace to the public health is created,
see Commonwealth ex rel. Shumaker v. New York & Pa. Co., 367 Pa. 40, 79 A.2d 439
(1951) ; McCallum v. Germantown Water Co., 54 Pa. 40 (1867) ; Barclay v. Commonwealth, 25 Pa. 503 (1855), clearly manifests authority under which the Commonwealth
may proceed to attack all such pollution under the guise of the Clean Streams Law.
Since the Act declares such activity to be a public nuisance, certain road blocks that
would otherwise have to be confronted are eliminated. With the declaration that
such activity is a public nuisance, it follows that the activity cannot be reasonable;
hence, there is no "balancing of equities" when a case of this nature arises, see
Commonwealth ex rel. Shumaker v. New York & Pa. Co., 367 Pa. 40, 79 A.2d 439
(1951). Furthermore, the rule of damnum absque injuria which arose from the case
of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 113 Pa. 126, 6 A. 453 (1886), has no application. In Sanderson, it was determined that injuries to a lower riparian resulting from
the natural use of the land were not actionable. Since the Act specifically declares
that such discharges are not natural uses of the land, the Sanderson doctrine has no
validity. Therefore, once a violation of the Act is alleged and proven, thereby showing a public nuisance, the Commonwealth may proceed to seek enforcement of the
provisions of the Act.
104. Municipalities have always been one of the major contributors to the pollution
of the Commonwealth's waters. The major cities have exhibited a reluctance to invest the necessary funds for proper sewage treatment facilities, which has resulted
in the destruction of many waterways. See generally Note, Statutory Stream Pollution
Control, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 225, 230 (1951).
105. See Sanitary Water Bd. v. Wilkes-Barre, 199 Pa. Super. 492, 185 A.2d 624
(1962). In this case, the City of Wilkes-Barre was dumping approximately 13,000,000
gallons of raw sewage into a river each day, with the obvious effect of total devastation of the watercourse. The court recognized that this process was clearly objectionable, since the public health was endangered and recreational use of the river had to
be halted because of the presence of disease carrying pathogenic organisms. See
also Commonwealth ex rel. v. Dravesburg, 95 Pitts. L.J. 91 (Allegheny County Pa.
C.P. 1947).
106. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 691.201 to .213 (1964), as amended (Supp. 1971).
107. Sewage is defined as: "Products or excrementitious or other discharges from
the bodies of humans or animals." PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 691.1 (Supp. 1971).
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a stream, or creates a danger of such pollution, is against public policy
and is a public nuisance.' 0 8
2.

Violations and Permits To Discharge

In enumerating the activities that constitute a public nuisance, the
Clean Streams Law espouses an absolute prohibition against the discharge
of any sewage by a municipality' 00 or person" into the water of the
Commonwealth,"' unless the discharge is undertaken pursuant to a permit
issued by the Department or is authorized by the rules and regulations
of the Quality Board." 2 The burden of establishing that the activity is
not contrary to the mandate of the Act and within the exception, is upon
the party who is discharging, or who wishes to discharge," 3 rather than
on the Department since the Act requires the municipality to secure a
108. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 691.3 (Supp. 1971). The Department is also given the
authority to confront one of the crucial problems in the area of water pollution
control - the protection of sources of water approved for public use. PA. STAT. tit.
35, § 691.501 (Supp. 1971). The Clean Streams Law, in addition to the powers

granted it in the aforementioned provision of the Act, gives the Department specific
authority to promulgate the necessary rules and regulations for the protection of
the present and future water supply and to issue and enforce orders pursuant to such
rules to protect the water supplies. The sections of the Act pertaining to domestic
water supplies are different from the sections pertaining to industrial or municipal
pollution, since it contains its own penalty provisions. Under this section, if any
person, including a public water supply company, see New Castle v. New Castle
Water Co., 250 Pa. 341, 95 A. 534 (1915), violates any rules of the Department, or
fails to comply with an order of the Department, such person may be subject to
prosecution in a summary proceeding and upon conviction may be subject to a fine.
PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 691.502 (1964) (maximum $500). If the party continues to violate
a rule or an order after such a conviction, he will be guilty of a misdemeanor and
subject to a further fine. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 691.502 (1964) (not less than $500 nor
more than $1000). Furthermore, such a violation is declared to be a nuisance which
may be enjoined under the abatement provisions of the Act. PA. STAT. tit. 35,
§ 691.507 (1964) (for abatement procedure, see PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 691.601 (1964)).
109. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 691.1 (Supp. 1971). Municipality as used in the statute
includes any county, city, borough, town, township, school district, institution or any
authority created by one of these governmental units. Id.
110. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 691.1 (Supp. 1971). Person is defined in the statute as
a natural person, partnership, association, or corporation. Id.
111. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 691.1 (Supp. 1971). "Waters of the Commonwealth"
include all rivers, streams, creeks, rivulets, impoundments, ditches, water courses,
storm sewers, lakes, dammed water, ponds, springs, and all channels of underground
water. Id.
112. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 691.201 (1964). See Sanitary Water Bd. v. Mico Enterprises, Inc., 84 Dauph. Co. Rep. 111 (Dauphin County Pa. C.P. 1965). This declaration seemingly raises the presumption that any discharge of sewage constitutes
pollution, and is therefore a public nuisance, unless proven otherwise.
113. Under the prior statute, PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 691.202 (1964), amended by PA.
STAT. tit. 35, § 691.202 (Supp. 1971), before a municipality was required to halt the
pollution of a watercourse, the Sanitary Water Board had to issue an order to stop
polluting. See Sanitary Water Bd. v. Coudersport, 81 Dauph. Co. Rep. 178 (Dauphin
County Pa. C.P. 1963), wherein the court stated:
It appears from the above statutory language that the Legislature in its attempt
to preserve and improve the purity of the waters of the Commonwealth did not
intend that all discharges of sewage be prohibited but only those which constitute
"pollution." Any order to discontinue an existing discharge of sewage would
therefore have to follow a hearing at which evidence was presented substantially
supporting the condition of "pollution" as defined.
Id. at 180-81. Under the current statute, the municipality is required to take the
initial action, since it is presumed by the statutory language that the discharge of
sewage is pollution.
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permit." 4 Under this system, the Department does not have to initiate
an investigation of the municipality's operation; rather, it is placed in a
position where the municipality must come to the Department and plead
its case.
Moreover, if the municipality is successful in securing a permit," 5
this does not mean that it may proceed to indiscriminately pollute the
water. The Act requires a permittee to comply strictly with the terms
of the permit." 6 Furthermore, its activities are also limited by any existing order, decree, judicial judgment, municipal ordinance, or rules of a
water company, since the issuance of a permit does not supersede any
such pronouncement." 7 These two limitations should act as an effective
deterrent to sewage pollution which is against the policy of the Act." 8
Moreover, since the impetus of enforcement now rests with the Department, rather than with the party who is discharging the sewage, further
control after the issuance of the permit should be obtained from the Department's power to revoke or change all permits issued. However, these
measures can be used only after an investigation and a hearing have
occurred. If the Department's investigation discloses that the permittee
is violating the permit, or that there is a change in circumstances, the
Department can then force it to cease discharging any wastes into the
waters, within a specific period upon notice. 119 Once this period of time
has lapsed, the violator must discontinue the discharge or have all the
provisions of the legislation operate against him, 120 thus causing any1 1
further discharge to be an abatable nuisance. 2
3.

Prevention of Sewage Pollution

Although the permit system aids in controlling pollution, it is only
a stop-gap measure; the real cornerstone of the abatement of municipal
sewage pollution is control through planning. Although it is obviously
necessary to setout prohibitions against the discharge of pollution, it is
also necessary that the Department be given authority to plan for the
future through preventive measures. To this end, the Clean Streams Law
sets out a comprehensive plan for municipal sewage pollution prevention.
If the Department determines that an existing sewage system or treatment
facility is not properly constructed to prevent pollution, the Department
may require the operator involved, usually a municipality, to acquire,
114. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 691.202 (Supp. 1971).
115. A permit to discharge sewage issued by the Department is not valid until
it is placed on file with the Recorder of Deeds in the county where the discharge is
taking place. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. If, however, the municipality is operating within the terms of a properly
issued permit, no public official may institute an action against it for abatement.
PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 691.601 (Supp. 1971).
119. PA. STAT. tit. 35, §§ 691.5(d)(1), .610 (Supp. 1971). After a hearing, the
Department may state the period within which the party must cease discharging.
120. Id.
121. Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol16/iss5/4

18

Paul and Shepard: Statutory Pollution Control in Pennsylvania

MAY

1971]

COMMENTS

construct, repair, alter, complete or extend such facilities, as preventive
measures. 122 The Department is vested with the authority to issue enforcement orders requiring the municipality to comply with those plans
within a specified period of time. 2 3
To complement its authority to require a municipality to construct
or alter treatment facilities, the Department may order a municipality to
file reports on such facilities detailing the effect that present discharges
are having on the surrounding waters. 124 The submission of such plans
could significantly add to the Department's ability to control future pollution in the immediate area of the discharge since the reports must be
prepared so as to exhibit what effect the present facilities are having, or
may have, on the water. 125 Furthermore, to aid the Department in this
goal, it is given the authority to order municipalities to undertake studies
and to submit plans for future construction. 12"
If, on the basis of this information, it is evident that the municipality
must construct new facilities, or extend or alter its present facilities, all
relevant plans and designs for the erection, construction, and location of
such new facilities must be submitted to the Department for its approval
by written permit before any action may be taken by the municipality. 127
If a municipality does not comply with this provision and proceeds to
undertake the construction without the approval of the Department, the
construction may be enjoined as a nuisance through the abatement pro128
vision of the Act.

The significance of this aspect of the legislation rests in its prospective nature, i.e., it is not so much concerned with the exigencies of the
current problem, but rather with the future. To achieve the goal of this
section of the Act it is necessary that the relevant data be submitted
immediately and foresight be employed by the planners so that multiplication of costs will not be necessary. Unless work of this nature is begun,
the present treatment facilities will rapidly become outdated, 129 thereby,
122. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 691.203(a) (Supp. 1971).
123. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 691.610 (Supp. 1971). See p. 888 infra. If the municipality fails to comply with any of the aforementioned orders, the Department may
refer the case to the Attorney General, who, upon application to the Commonwealth
Court, or the Common Pleas Court of the County where the municipality is located,
may institute suit to enforce the order. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 691.210 (Supp. 1971).
124. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 691.203(b) (Supp. 1971).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 691.207 (1964).
128. Id. See Sanitary Water Bd. v. New Oxford Municipal Authority, 79 Dauph.
Co. Rep. 316 (Dauphin County Pa. C.P. 1962), wherein the court, interpreting the
Sanitary Water Board's authority under section 207, declared:
There is no question that the Authority's construction of the shorter outfall sewer,
resulted in the discharge of effluent from its sewage treatment plant into the
unnamed tributary rather than to the South Branch on Conewago Creek, constituted a departure from the approved plans and conditions established in the
original permit which had been issued to it by the Board. The Board would have
ample authority to consider the departure a nuisance and to order it abated under
Section 207 of the Clean Streams Law, without further ado.
Id. at 318.
129. Although treatment facilities have been in operation in some areas of Pennsylvania for many years, the great majority of them were poorly planned. The effect
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forcing a substantial economic burden on the municipalities for a second
time. Furthermore, if the Department undertakes this program and enforces it, it is possible to avert the contamination of water and at the
same time begin planning toward the reclamation of areas with the knowledge that these plans will not be frustrated by inadequate sewage treatment facilities.
4.

Financing A Sewage Treatment Facility
a. Revenue Bonds

Since the municipalities have a duty to construct sewage systems and
treatment facilities, they have the corresponding burden of financing their
construction. The Clean Streams Law authorizes municipalities to issue
non-debt revenue bonds, secured solely by pledges against the rental or
charge for the use of the facilities, to fund the construction of the facilities. 13 0 The issuance of these bonds does not create a debt, pledge the
credit, or raise a charge against the general revenue, or create a lien
against the property of the municipality.' 3 ' The municipality must offer
the bonds at competitive bidding to the highest bidder, and if no bids are
18 2
received, the bonds may be sold at private sale at no less than par.
The bonds are payable in no more than thirty years with a maximum
interest rate of six per cent. 133 Municipalities are also given similar
authority under the Municipal Borrowing Law, 34 which provides that
a municipality authorized by law to construct, acquire, or extend any
public works, may borrow money for the purpose of constructing such
of the lack of long range planning is presently being felt by the municipalities since
they are now violating the Clean Streams Law because their facilities are either not
large enough to handle the amount of sewage that is being generated, or they are

not treating the sewage to the degree necessary to meet the criteria of the Act and
the rules and regulations. See Philadelphia Inquirer, March 7, 1971, § N.W., at 1,
col. 2. Thus, it is submitted that emphasis must be placed on long range planning to
avoid the cost of reconstruction or expansion of existing facilities.
130. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 691.211 (1964). However, there are a number of situations where municipalities have been unable to secure the necessary funds to build
the necessary facilities. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Sennett v. Irwin, 91 Dauph.
Co. Rep. 270 (Dauphin County Pa. C.P. 1969); Commonwealth ex rel. Sennett v.
Dunbar, 91 Dauph. Co. Rep. 103 (Dauphin County Pa. C.P. 1969); Commonwealth
ex rel. Sennett v. North Huntington, 91 Dauph. Co. Rep. 106 (Dauphin County Pa.
C.P. 1969); Commonwealth ex rel. Sennett v. Cokeburg, 89 Dauph. Co. Rep. 362
(Dauphin County Pa. C.P. 1968) ; Commonwealth ex rel. Alessandroni v. Tionesta,
87 Dauph. Co. Rep. 204 (Dauphin County Pa. C.P. 1967).
131. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 691.211 (1964). Revenue bonds are obligations issued by
a government unit which are payable only from a fund created by the income of the
project erected with the proceeds of the bond issue. The holders of these bonds have
no claim upon the general funds of the government unit raised by taxation, or against
the general credit of the government unit. The outstanding feature of revenue bonds is
that they are not included in the computation of the amount of debt that a government
unit may issue under the constitutional debt limitation provisions. Thus, they are a
flexible financing vehicle for government units to employ. See generally Comment,
Municipal Debt Limitation in Pennsylvania, 15 VILL. L. REV. 612 (1970).
132. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 691.212 (1964).
133. Id.
134. PA. STAT. tit. 53, §§ 6101 et seq. (1957), as amended (Supp. 1971).
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facilities by the issuance of non-debt revenue bonds. 1 35 It is clear, therefore, that the municipalities have authority to finance the construction of
these facilities without endangering their general credit or placing an
added burden upon their already overburdened budgets.
b. Other Means of Financing Facilities
The Clean Streams Law makes it clear that the non-debt revenue
bonds are not the exclusive means by which a municipality can finance
the construction of these facilities. 136 A municipality can issue any type
of bond or assess the property of landowners in any manner authorized
by law. Accordingly, a municipality may partially finance the construc137
tion of a sewage system by assessment of the abutting property owners.
Alternatively, a municipality, while financing a sewage treatment facility,
may issue general obligation bonds. 1 38 However, the availability of general obligation bonds is limited since the issuance of such bonds must be
in compliance with the debt limitation of the Pennsylvania Constitution. 1 9
c.

State Aid

In addition to the self financing methods outlined above, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in response to the needs of the municipalities,
has enacted a statute140 providing that the Commonwealth will contribute
two per cent of the cost of construction of sewage treatment facilities.
The Commonwealth, through the Department, also allocated the sum of
$100 million under the Land and Water Conservation and Reclamation
Act,' 4 ' to aid municipalities in the construction, reconstruction and improvement of municipal sewage treatment plants. 1 42 The Secretary of the
Department of Environmental Resources makes the grants pursuant to
4
the rules and regulations of the Quality Board.1 '
d. Joint Action By Municipalities
Despite the procedures outlined above, it is foreseeable that many
of the smaller municipalities will be unable to raise the requisite funds
135. Many of the municipal codes, by identical provisions, empower municipalities
to issue non-debt revenue bonds to finance the cost of construction or extension of
sewage treatment works. See generally Reader, Financing Municipal Sewage Treatment Facilities in Pennsylvania by Use of Municipalities Authorities, 58 DIcK. L.
REv. 327, 332-34 (1954). See also Commonwealth ex rel. Alessandroni v. Confluence,
82 Dauph. Co. Rep. 187 (Dauphin County Pa. C.P. 1964).
136. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 691.213 (1964).
137. See, e.g., PA. STAT. tit. 53, § 38203 (Supp. 1971) (Third Class City); PA.
STAT. tit. 53, § 47101 (1966) (Boroughs) ; PA. STAT. tit. 53, § 57406 (Supp. 1971)
(First Class Township) ; PA. STAT. tit. 53, § 66507 (1957) (Second Class Township).
See generally Reader, supra note 135, at 329-32.
138. See, e.g., PA. STAT. tit. 53, § 6101-6714 (1957), as amended (Supp. 1971).
139. PA. CONST., art. 9, § 10. See generally Comment, supra note 131, at 623.
140. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 701 et seq. (Supp. 1971).
141. PA. STAT. tit. 32, § 5101 et seq. (Supp. 1971).
142. PA. STAT. tit. 32, § 5116(a) (2) (Supp. 1971).
143. See RULES AND REGULATIONS art. 500, §§ 1-12 (1970).
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to construct or improve their sewage treatment facilities. In response to
this need, it is suggested that the Clean Streams Law be amended to
provide specifically for joint activity by municipalities, since it is normally
more economical for a group of small municipalities to join together to
finance and construct a sewage treatment unit. Although such authority
partially exists under the municipal codes'" and within the Clean Streams
Law,'145 there is a pressing need to establish explicit guidelines within
the Act to show what procedure is the most appropriate for the municipalities to follow.

146

C. Industrial Wastes
1.

Introduction

Industrial pollution is the most detrimental type of pollution to the
Commonwealth's water quality. Industries discharge organic wastes into
the waters with a pollution strength double that of municipal sewage, 147
and the range of inorganic matter that is permitted to flow into the
streams causes irreparable harm to aquatic life.1 48 The complexity of
industrial pollution is further magnified by the fact that, unlike municipal
sewage, industrial wastes are caused by diverse sources; they flow from
pulp and paper, food processing, chemical, metal manufacturing, mining,
textile, or petroleum plants and from dozens of other industrial establishments that all contribute to the problem.' 49 Industry has failed to take
any effective voluntary measures to solve this problem' 50 thus making it
clear that governmental action is necessary. Toward this end, the Clean
Streams Law has established criteria which industry must meet.
2.

ProhibitionAgainst Discharging Industrial Wastes
and the Permit System
Under the Act, industrial waste is defined in the following manner:
Industrial waste shall be construed to mean any liquid, gaseous,
radioactive, solid or other substance, not sewage, resulting from any
manufacturing or industry, or from any establishment, as herein defined, and mine drainage, silt, coal mine solids, rock, debris, dirt and
clay from coal mines, coal collieries, breakers or other coal processing

144. See, e.g., PA. STAT. tit. 53, §§ 57440, 57441 (1957) (First Class Township).
145. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 691.5 (a) (3) (Supp. 1971).
146. Since the Act sets out in detail the means through which a treatment facility
may be financed, there is no apparent reason why basic rules for joint financing could
not also be enumerated within the Act. If the Legislature fails to take action in this
area, the Department must take the responsibility for formulating guidelines which
the municipalities are to follow.
147. See Hines, Controlling Industrial Water Pollution: Color The Problem
Green, 9 B.C. INn. & Coa. L. REv. 553, 555 (1968).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 557-69.
150. One possible reason for industry's failure to clean up its operation is the
reluctance to spend money on treatment facilities, since the basic economic result of
the expenditure decreases profits, absent the passing on of these costs to consumers.
See generally Rose, The Economics of Environmental Quality, in THE ENVIRONMIENT
(Fortune ed. 1970).
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operation. Industrial waste shall include all such substances whether
or not generally characterized as waste. 51
Operating within the precepts of this definition, the Act expressly prohibits
the placing, permitting to be placed, discharge, permitting to flow, or
continuation of a discharge of any matter which constitutes industrial
waste unless the party has secured a permit. 152 It is clear, therefore, that
industry has an affirmative duty, much the same as municipalities do
with respect to sewage, to stop discharging industrial wastes into the
waters of the Commonwealth 53 unless the industry has been granted a
54
permit by the Department to discharge certain amounts of pollutants.
One significant aspect of the Act is that the discharge of industrial waste
into the water of the Commonwealth includes a discharge of such waste
into a municipal sewage system which flows into the waters of the Commonwealth. This prohibition makes it clear that a party cannot avoid
the impact of the Act by discharging industrial waste indirectly.155 This
aspect takes on extreme importance because it links the part of the Act
regulating industrial pollution with that part regulating sewage pollution
thus, solving a problem which up to this time has been left uncorrected.
151. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 691.1 (Supp. 1971).
152. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 691.301 (Supp. 1971). See Commonwealth v. Sonneborn,
164 Pa. Super. 493, 66 A.2d 584 (1949).
153. It should also be noted that the discharge of industrial waste which causes or
contributes to the pollution of a watercourse is not a reasonable or natural use of the
land and is a public nuisance. Thus, the defense of reasonable use or natural use is
not available to a defendant when an action is brought under the Act. See PA. STAT.
tit. 35, § 691.3 (Supp. 1971). It would seem that the only defense available is the
fact that the pollution is caused by an accident. See Kernan v. Gulf Oil Corp., 231
F. Supp. 339 (E.D. Pa. 1964), aff'd, 341 F.2d 920 (3d Cir. 1965) ; RULES AND REGULATIONS art. 600, § 1 (1970).
154. Under this declaration all discharges of industrial waste from an exisitng
facility are a violation of the Act if they are undertaken without a permit, or if the
discharge does not comply with the rules and regulations of the Quality Board. PA.
STAT. tit. 35, § 691.307 (Supp. 1971). Thus, the industry has the responsibility of
making sure that it comes within the terms of the Act. Under the prior section of
the Act, PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 691.302 (repealed 1970), the Sanitary Water Board had

to give notice to the polluter to discontinue discharging after an investigation. Thus
the burden of initial action was on the Sanitary Water Board and the polluter could
continue discharging until the Board took such action. However, failure of the Board
to issue an order to discontinue such discharge did not act as a defense to an action
to declare such activity a nuisance. See Commonwealth v. Sonneborn, 164 Pa. Super.
493, 66 A.2d 584 (1949). In Sonneborn, the court determined that although the burden
of initial action was on the Board to require a party to secure a permit or stop discharging, the discharge of industrial waste could be prosecuted in a court whether or
not the Board had issued an order. Although the Sonneborn court's interpretation of
the Act held the threat of judicial action before a violator, in reality the threat was
impotent as exemplified by the lack of prosecutions. Therefore, it is clear that the
present section of the Act is much more appropriate since the Department does not
have to take the initial steps required under the prior Act to force the polluter to
secure a permit.
The Act also provides that when a party applies for a permit, such application
must be published in a newspaper in the county where the discharge is taking place,
or will take place. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 691.307 (Supp. 1971). Theoretically, therefore, if a landowner or the general public has an interest in having the permit denied,
he is given notice that an application for a permit has been made and an opportunity
to express his views. Although the thrust of this requirement is totally valid and
necessary it is questionable whether the public will actually be put on notice by such
publication.
155. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 691.307 (Supp. 1971).
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This problem has arisen because municipalities have in the past given
very little thought in planning the construction of sewage treatment facilities to treatment of the vast array of chemicals and toxic substances that
result from industrial production. Hence, these treatment facilities, although adequately purifying municipal sewage, have left industrial waste
unaffected, thus allowing it to flow into the waters as if it had never been
through a treatment process. This new approach should eradicate most
of this problem by either forcing industry to cooperate with municipalities
in providing adequate treatment facilities for industrial waste, or requiring
150
them to construct their own facilities.
3.

Eminent Domain

In order to assist an industry which is faced with the perplexing
problem of being required to cease discharging industrial wastes into the
waters of the Commonwealth by the construction of treatment facilities,
the Act provides that the right of eminent domain may be vested in a
corporation if the order to cease discharging could materially affect the
operation of its business. 157 If the corporation is not vested with the right
of eminent domain under any other statute, it may apply to the Department for an order stating that the use of a specific piece of property is
necessary to effectuate the public policy of the Act.' 5 8 If the Department
finds that it is necessary for the corporation to procure this property in
order to eliminate, reduce, or control pollution, it may give the corporation the power of eminent domain to be exercised under the authorization
of the Department' 59 in the manner established by the Eminent Domain
Code. 160 The corporation, however, is not given the authority through
%thisprovision to take property that is devoted to public use.' 0 ' If a public
street is taken in connection with this power, the corporation must reimburse the public utility or municipality for the expense of relocating
162
their facilities.
4.

Submission of Information

The Act also requires any party discharging industrial waste into the
waters of the Commonwealth to file all information with the Department
pertaining to the kind, character and rate of flow of all pollution that the
156. If the industry wishes to construct its own facility it must submit all relevant
plans and data to the Department for approval. It may not take any action on construction or erection of the facility until the Department has given its approval.
PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 691.308 (Supp. 1971).
157. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 691.314 (Supp. 1971).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. PA. STAT. tit. 26, §§ 1-401 et seq., 1-501 et seq. (Supp. 1971). See also PA.
STAT. tit. 15, §§ 3021 to 3023 (1967).
161. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 691.314 (Supp. 1971). This includes property owned by
a public utility, or used as a place of worship or burial.
162. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 691.314 (Supp. 1971).
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person is presently discharging or may discharge in the future. 0 3 This
information can be used as a means of analyzing the probabilities that a
watercourse may become polluted through the actions of many small
polluters or through activities which at the present time are not causing
pollution. To further this same goal, the Department has the power to
undertake a complete survey of the water of the Commonwealth in order
to ascertain the extent of pollution.0 4 With this information, the Department can fashion appropriate remedies and issue rules and regulations
to maintain the purity of waters, or to purify those that are polluted. 1 5
In addition, the Department may conduct investigations, experiments, and
research for the protection of public health as well as animal and aquatic
life, and the maintenance and purification of waters for domestic and
160
recreational uses.
D.
1.

Operation of Mines

Pollution From Mines

One of the major problems that falls under the heading of industrial
wastes 0 7 is pollution from mines. 6 This problem has consistently caused
the pollution of thousands of miles of the waters of the Commonwealth.1 69
The effects of this type of pollution are widespread; it requires municipalities to install treatment facilities to purify wastes, as well as replace
corroded waterworks, and the early replacement of bridges and all other
163. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 691.303 (1964). Although this section, on its face, apparently contradicts the aforementioned section which states that no person may discharge
industrial waste into the waters of the Commonwealth, if interpreted in light of the
fact that some industrial waste may be discharged under a permit, or within the rules
and regulations of the Quality Board, the section becomes significant as a measure to
prevent future pollution.
164. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 691.304 (1964).
165. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 691.304 (1964).
166. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 691.305 (1964) ; Sanitary Water Bd. v. Glen Alden Corp.,
83 Dauph. Co. Rep. 108, 121 (Dauphin County Pa. C.P. 1964). In Glen Alden it was
recognized that the expense of conducting research must be borne by the Commonwealth and cannot be transferred to a property owner.
One aspect of subsection .305 could very well raise constitutional questions
under the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution. Subsection .305 is
phrased in the following manner: "Its agents may enter upon lands, buildings, and
premises as may be necessary for its investigation." This wording would seem to bring
this investigation within the confines of the term "search" as used in the fourth amendment, thus necessitating that the agent secure a search warrant. This result is dictated
by the recent United States Supreme Court cases of Camara v. Municipal Court, 387
U.S. 523 (1967) and See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967). In Camaraand See definitive
rules were laid down as to the rights of homeowners and businessmen and the method
of inspection necessary to comply with the mandate of the Constitution. The focus of
these cases indicate that if a homeowner or businessman refuses an inspector entry,
the inspector, or agent in this case, must proceed to secure a search warrant. See
generally Mulchay, Camara and See: A Constitutional Problem With Effect on Air
Pollution Control, 10 ARIZ. L. REV. 120 (1968).
167. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 691.1 (Supp. 1971).
168. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 691.1 (Supp. 1971). The term mines as used in the Clean
Streams Law specifically means coal or clay mines and-more generally any facility
from which minerals are extracted from the earth. Id.
169. See Hearings on S. 1870 Before the Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution
of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 320 (1967).
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structures that come in contact with it.1 7 ° To remedy this problem, the
Commonwealth has undertaken a preventive approach to pollution from
mine drainage.' 7' As it does for sewage and industrial wastes, the Clean
Streams Law

72

states that a party may not operate a mine so as to dis-

charge wastes into the water of the Commonwealth unless such discharge
is authorized by the rules and regulations of the Department 173 or the
party has obtained a permit from the Department. 7 4 The Department's
control over mines is especially sweeping, 175 since by definition "operation
of a mine" includes not only the actual operation, but also any preparatory
work or work undertaken in conjunction with closing operations.7 6
170. Id. at 322. In a study undertaken by the Department of the Interior in 1965,
it was determined that two-thirds of the streams in the Appalachian area are polluted
to the point where they could not support fishlife.
171. The preventive approach to controlling mine drainage pollution is the process
by which steps are taken to remove the pollutants from the drainage before it enters
a watercourse. This approach offers the advantage that the water can be used for all
purposes with the mining operation being allowed to continue. A second approach to
the problem is to remove the impurities from the water as the water is required for
use. The obvious disadvantage to this approach is the loss of the use of the water for
all purposes until the pollutants are removed. Moreover, the extraction of the impurities is a very costly undertaking. Id. at 322-23. It is suggested that the vast
majority of pollutants can be stopped from reaching the waterways before damage
occurs at a savings to all parties concerned. See generally Hines, Controlling Industrial Water Pollution: Color the Problem Green, 9 B.C. IND. & Com. L. REV. 553,
564 (1968).
172. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 691.315(a) (Supp. 1971).

173. See

RULES AND REGULATIONS

art. 700, § 1 et seq. (1970).

174. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 691.315(a) (Supp. 1971). If a party undertakes a mining
operation before the permit is actually granted or contrary to the terms of a permit,
such action is a nuisance. See Commonwealth ex rel. Chidsey v. Black, 363 Pa. 231,
69 A.2d 376 (1949), wherein the court referring to the requirement of securing a
permit stated :
It clearly prohibits the opening of any new coal mine, or the reopening of an old
coal mine, or the continuance in operation of any existing coal mine, until a plan
of mine drainage has been approved by the Commonwealth, acting through its
official agency. The statute does not say that if the mine owners can show that
there will be no acid mine drainage into clean streams, such approval need not
be obtained. In order to avoid the peril of having its streams polluted the
Commonwealth assumes that the drainage from every coal mine is a potential
menace to the purity of nearby waters, and provides that before such a mine can
be opened plans must be submitted which will satisfy the Commonwealth that
this peril will be obviated.
Id. at 239, 69 A.2d at 380. See also Sanitary Water Bd. v. Tri-County Fuel Co., 79
Dauph. Co. Rep. 128 (Dauphin County Pa. C.P. 1962), wherein the court upheld the
denial of a permit because the mining operation would result in pollution.
Furthermore, the municipality within which the operation is to be undertaken
must be given notice before the issuance or the hearing on the issuance, whichever is
first. This aspect is significant in that it is clear that the public interest will be protected since the representatives of the citizenry must be given notice so that they have
an opportunity to express their views.
175. If the coal mine operator is not financially able to undertake the expense of
building a treatment facility and the Commonwealth under the auspices of the Land
and Water Conservation and Reclamation Act, PA. STAT. tit. 32, § 5101 et seq. (Supp.
1971), has constructed a treatment facility, upon request to the Commonwealth, the
mine operator may be permitted to discharge his drainage into the plant at a fee based
on the proportionate share of the cost and the quantity and quality of the pollutant.
PA. STAT. tit. 32, § 5116(1) (II). If this type of action is undertaken by the Commonwealth, it could prove to be the most effective method of abating the problem of mine
drainage.
176. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 691.315(a) (Supp. 1971).
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Abandoned Mines

The statute also makes it clear that the phrase "discharge from a
mine" includes discharges which occur after the mining operations have
ceased,'

77

provided the mining operations were conducted after 1966.178

The significance of this provision becomes evident when disclosure is made
of the fact that more than fifty per cent of all pollutants discharged from
mines come from those that are no longer in operation. 17 9 Until the present legislation was enacted, this problem was left unsolved. If, however,
this section of the Act is enforced, i.e., mine operators are held responsible
for the pollution that results from the mines that they have abandoned
the problem could be effectively solved.' 80
To aid in the enforcement of this section of the legislation, the
Department may require an applicant for a permit to post a bond in favor
of the Commonwealth to insure that pollution will not result from drainage from the mine.' 8 ' Under this section, the Department has a method
to force the party to effectuate the restoration measures necessary after
the mining operations have ceased so that pollution will not result in the
future.' 8 2 If the party does not post such a bond, the Department may
83
refuse to issue a permit.'
177. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 691.315(b) (Supp. 1971).
178. It was not until January 1, 1966, that mining operations were required by law
to be undertaken pursuant to a permit. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 691.315 (repealed 1970).
179. See Hearings,supra note 169, at 322.
180. The Clean Streams Law is presently lacking in the respect that there is no
effective way to place the burden on the former mine operator who abandoned his mine
before January 1, 1966. The reponsibility for the discharge from these mines must
rest on the Commonwealth under the Land and Water Conservation and Reclamation
Act, PA. STAT. tit. 32, § 5101 et seq. (Supp. 1971). Under this Act the Commonwealth
may create the Land and Water Conservation Fund, in the amount of $500 million
for the conservation and reclamation of land and water resources, including the
elimination of acid mine drainage, the restoration of abandoned strip-mines, and the
prevention of subsidence resulting from mining operations. Under section 5116 of
the Act, $200 million is alloted to the Department of Environmental Resources
(formerly to the Department of Mines and Mineral Industries) for the elimination
of land and water scars created by past coal mining operations. One hundred and
fifty million dollars of such funds are to be used for the prevention, control, and
elimination of stream pollution resulting from mine drainage. The Department is also
given the Authority to construct and operate treatment facilities for the control and
treatment of mine drainage. If these sections of the Act are put to use the problem of
mine drainage from abandoned mines can be eliminated.
181. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 691.315(b) (Supp. 1971).
182. The bond will remain in effect until the Department determines that there is
no further risk of pollution.
183. The enactment of section .315(b) could be in response to the holding in the
case of Sanitary Water Bd. v. Sunbeam Coal Corp., 47 Pa. D. & C.2d 378 (Dauphin
County C.P. 1969), wherein the court overruled a refusal to grant a mine operator a
permit because he failed to comply with other outstanding permits. The court was
concerned with the fact that by the condition of the Sanitary Water Board's permit
the mine operator would be "an insurer of pure water in the area for all time." The
court stated:
Of further significance is the fact that the Clean Streams Act specifically
referred to the mines being opened, reopened or continued in operation. Nowhere
in the Clean Streams Act is it suggested or implied that a former operator of an
abandoned mine can be held in "violation" after the mine is closed.
Id. at 386. Section 315(b) now avoids the problem confronted by the court since it
is no longer necessary to find a party in "violation" of the Act, rather all that is
necessary is to redeem the bond and undertake corrective measures. The expense of
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Responsibility of Landowners With Respect
To Abandoned Mines

The section pertaining to mines also vests in the Department the
power to require a landowner or occupier to correct any condition on his
land which is the result of a mining operation which is causing or may
cause the pollution of a watercourse, or require the landowner to allow
the former mine operator, or agent of the state, to come onto the land
and correct the condition. 8 4 The significance of this section is that it
vests in the Department the power to correct conditions that are not
actually causing pollution at the present time. 8 5 It also permits the
Commonwealth to take action against mines, either in operation or abandoned, which are causing pollution. One of the major shortcomings of
traditional water pollution statutes was that the posture of the statute
was punishment or injunctive relief for actions that were already causing
pollution. Before the Department could take any action, it was necessary
that damage had occurred or was in progress. The past statutes were
void of any measures that could be taken to prevent or control pollution.
But with the enactment of the present statute, the Department is given
the authority to confront the problem before actual damage occurs. This
approach seems to be the only rational means of attack if the Commonwealth is to stop pollution before it occurs since there would be very little
reason to begin major reclamation programs if all the funds and efforts
put into such programs could be destroyed overnight by a problem that
was known to exist, but which the authorities were without the power to
prevent or control.
Under this expanded authority, the Department can now require a
landowner to take action to correct the condition on his land before injury
takes place, as well as correcting conditions that are actually causing
damage. The Act also provides that a landowner must allow a former
mine operator to come onto his land and correct a condition that is causing damage or may cause damage. Presumably, this aspect of the section
is meant to operate in conjunction with the section of the Act pertaining
to abandoned mines, which as previously noted, now states that a mine
operator is responsible for the mine drainage, that causes pollution, even
after the mine has ceased operation. 8 6 Since the mine operators are now
liable for pollution under a bond which they must post, they must be
permitted to come onto the land which they formerly leased to correct
the condition. An agent of the Commonwealth must also be allowed to
come on the land after an order is issued to correct the condition if proper
action is not taken by either the landowner or the mine operator. If the
Commonwealth undertakes this operation at its own expense, it is vested
these corrective measures will run to the party who causes the harm if he voluntarily
fails to comply.
184. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 691.316 (Supp. 1971).
185. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 691.316 (Supp. 1971).
186. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 691.315(a) (Supp. 1971).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol16/iss5/4

28

Paul and Shepard: Statutory Pollution Control in Pennsylvania

MAY

1971]

COMMENTS

with the power to assess the amount due against the landowner. 187 It
would also seem that the Commonwealth could undertake these activities
at its own expense under the provisions of the Land and Water Conservation and Reclamation Act.

E.
1.

88

Other Pollution

Discharge From Land

The Clean Streams Law also establishes a prohibition against the
discharge, or permitting to be discharged, any substance of any kind which
will pollute the waters of the Commonwealth. 89 This section of the Act
is couched in very broad terms, relying on the definition of "pollution"' 90
to delineate which substances when discharged into a watercourse constitutes a violation of the Act. With the definition of pollution as the
cornerstone of this section, any discharge, whether active or passive,
which is deleterious to a watercourse is brought within the terms of the
Act.191 The main thrust of this section is aimed at substances which do
not constitute sewage or industrial waste. Thus, the Department is given
authority to control all forms of discharges which will degrade the waters,
including those caused by agricultural pollution resulting from allowing
nitrates, phosphates and pesticides to flow into a waterway. 92 In addition, pollutants discharged from operations such as landfills, construction
187. PA. STAT. tit.35, § 691.316 (Supp. 1971). See PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 691.605
(Supp. 1971), for the procedure on how fines are to be assessed.

188. PA. STAT. tit. 32, § 5116 (Supp. 1971).
189. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 691.401 (Supp. 1971).
190. Pollution is defined in pertinent part as:
"Pollution" shall be construed to mean contamination of any waters of the
Commonwealth such as will create or is likely to create a nuisance or to render
such waters harmful, detrimental or injurious to public health, safety or welfare,
or to domestic, municipal, commercial, industrial, agricultural, recreational, or
other legitimate beneficial uses, or to livestock, wild animals, birds, fish or other
aquatic life, including but not limited to such contamination by alteration or the
physical, chemical or biological properties of such waters, or change in temperature, taste, color or odor thereof....
PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 691.1 (Supp. 1971).
191. See Commonwealth v. Ebersole, 59 Lanc. L. Rev. 363 (Lancaster County Pa.
C.P. 1965), wherein the court found a violation of the Act as a result of seepage of
liquid substances from a landfill operation. Under the other sections of the Act, this
activity would not have constituted a violation since the court did not characterize
the discharge as sewage or industrial waste, but rather relied on the fact that this
substance was causing the pollution of the "waters" of the Commonwealth.
192. It is not disputed that pollution resulting from agricultural operation causes
great harm to the nation's, as well as to the Commonwealth's waterways. If the
waters of the Commonwealth are to be cleaned up to any considerable extent, the
efforts of those who are confronting the pollution problem are going to have to turn
to the agricultural problem. See REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS OF PENNSYLVANIA CONFERENCE ON AGRICULTURAL WASTE MANAGEMENT (Pennsylvania Dep't of Agriculture
1970). See generally Hines, Agriculture: The Unseen Foe In The War On Pollution,
55 CORNELL L. REV. 740 (1970).
Although, it is possible to bring an action against a party for agricultural
pollution under section 401 of the Act, the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to control the problem is not expressly vested in the Department here or in any
other section of the Act, although, it is arguable that the Department has this authority
under section 402. It is submitted that the legislature should give the Department
the express authority and the regulatory power to undertake a full scale attack on
this problem.
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or lumbering sites, or impoundments which result in the deterioration of
water quality, would be deemed unlawful. 193
2.

Potential Pollution

The Department is also vested with power to regulate this type of
pollution through the permit system. 19 4 This is a significant addition to
the Department's power since prior to the enactment of the present Act
there was no way to control non-sewage or industrial pollution through
the use of permits. Under this section, the Department is vested with
broad discretionary power to determine what activities must be carried
on pursuant to a permit or conditions that it otherwise may establish.
The Department, therefore, is given authority to control potential pollution caused by activities such as impounding, handling, storage, transportation, or processing of pollutant substances. 19 To supplement this authority
193. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 691.401 (Supp. 1971). See also RULES AND REGULATIONS
art. 800, § 1 et seq. (1970).

It seems clear that this section is consistent with the common law tradition
that a landowner is responsible for injury to others that results
from an activity that
is undertaken on his land. This principle has validity whether or not the landowner's
actions directly cause the injury. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 364, 365 (1934);

McArthur v. Balas, 402 Pa. 116, 166 A.2d 640 (1961); McCarthy v. Ference, 358
Pa. 485, 58 A.2d 49 (1948) ; Pennsylvania R.R. v. Pittsburgh, 335 Pa. 449, 6 A.2d 907
(1939) ; McCallum v. Germantown Water Co., 54 Pa. 40 (1867). It is also consistent
with the other section of the Act which states that a person may not "place or permit
to be placed, or discharged" any pollutant from his land. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 691.301
(Supp. 1971).
Under the Act and the common law, a property owner who creates, or allows
to be created a condition that will cause pollution can be forced to abate the problem.
However, a serious question is raised when a party purchases land, after the condition
is created and without notice of the condition and is asked to abate the problem. Under
the pertinent section of the Restatement, it is stated that a party is liable if he knows
or should have known that the condition was created before he took possession. See
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 364, 366 (1934).
Section 366 of the Restatement
places liability on a purchaser if a reasonable inspection would have disclosed also
the
condition. In comment d of said section, it is stated that the condition must have been
discoverable and the unreasonable risk realized, with the location and condition of
the land being a consideration. Therefore, it is likely that a party who did not cause
the condition but had knowledge of its existence and danger would also be liable
under the Act. The question still remains, however, as to whether he would be liable
if the condition was not discoverable on inspection. It would seem that under the
Restatement he would not be liable. The answer to this question could rest in the
permit system. If each landowner who intended to use his land for an activity that
could potentially cause pollution, i.e., a landfill, was required to secure a permit and
file it with the registry of deeds in the county of the situs of the property, each successor in title would be deemed to have notice of the condition and section 401 could
be effectively enforced in the future.
194. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 691.402 (Supp. 1971). The significance of this section
rests in its prospective nature. The Department now has the authority to control
activities that are not presently causing pollution, but may, at some future date, cause
irreparable damage to the Commonwealth's waterways. This type of foundation
significantly expands the Department's power, since it now has the discretionary
authority to require all activities that might potentially cause pollution to be conducted
pursuant to established guidelines, either in the form of a permit or specific rules and
regulations. If this authority is effectively used, potential destruction, which could
not be controlled prior to this enactment, can be avoided.

195. See

RULES AND REGULATIONS

art. 800, § 1 et seq. (1970). Section 2B of the

rules states in pertinent part:
All persons and municipalities engaged in an activity which includes the impoundment, production, processing, transportation, storage, use, application or
disposal of polluting substances shall take all necessary measures to prevent such

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol16/iss5/4

30

Paul and Shepard: Statutory Pollution Control in Pennsylvania

MAY

1971]

COMMENTS

the Department is specifically granted the power to promulgate the necessary rules and regulations for enumerating those activities which must be
conducted under a permit. 190 If the Department specifies that a certain
activity must be conducted under a permit, and a party fails to secure
97
one, further pollution is an abatable nuisance.'
F.
1.

Procedure and Enforcement

Abatement of Nuisance

Under the enforcement provisions of the Clean Streams Law, any
activity declared to be a nuisance under the Act may be abated in the
manner provided for by law or equity, which, under normal circumstances, would be through an injunction. 198 The Department is therefore
vested with the authority to abate any condition which violates the Act,191
i.e., the discharge of sewage, industrial waste, or petty pollutants without
a permit on a violation of any order or permit 2 0 of the Department, or
rules and regulations promulgated by the Quality Board, 201 as well as
undertaking the construction of facilities without the approval of the
Department, where such approval is necessary. 20 2 Under this broad declaration of authority, the Department has full power to abate any nuisance
resulting from any of the aforementioned violations. The propriety of
substances from reaching waters of the Commonwealth, directly or indirectly,
through accident, carelessness, maliciousness, hazards of weather or from any other
cause. Upon notice from the department and within the time specified in the
notice, such person or municipality shall submit to the department a report or
plan setting forth the nature of the activity, the nature of the preventive measures
taken to comply with this subsection and such other information as the department may require.
One of the important aspects of this regulation is the requirement that the
party submit reports, or plans to the Department. In this way, the Department will
be completely informed as to what preventive measures are being taken, and with this
knowledge can thoroughly assess what steps are necessary for complete protection.
196. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 691.402 (Supp. 1971).
197. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 691.402(b) (Supp. 1971). Since this activity is a nuisance,
the Department may use any enforcement technique available to it to force the violator
to comply, before actual injury takes places.
198. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 691.601 (Supp. 1971). The Department may proceed to
secure an injunction without going through the process of using the administrative
agencies. In Commonwealth ex rel. Shumaker v. New York & Pa. Co., 367 Pa. 40, 79
A.2d 439 (1951), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania recognized this stating:
[W]e think the act itself makes clear that it was never intended to strip from
the courts their historic jurisdiction to determine what is a nuisance in fact, and
confer that power exclusively upon an administrative agency. Nor can we agree
with the proposition asserted by the court below that even in proceeding under
the act the Board must first determine the pollution to be harmful or that it
must otherwise be shown that the defendant acted contrary to the Board's requirements before there can be recourse to the courts to enforce its provisions.
Id. at 53, 79 A.2d at 446.
199. 367 Pa. at 53, 79 A.2d at 446.
200. Since the failure to comply with an order is a nuisance, PA. STAT. tit. 35,
§ 691.610 (Supp. 1971), and the violation of a permit is a nuisance, PA. STAT. tit. 35,
§ 691.202 (Supp. 1971), the Department may proceed to enjoin such activity under
subsection .601 of the Act. See, e.g., Sanitary Water Bd. v. New Oxford Municipal
Authority, 79 Dauph. Co. Rep. 316 (Dauphin County Pa. C.P. 1962).
201. See Commonwealth ex rel. Carlin v. Echo, 19 Bucks Co. L. Rptr. 110 (Bucks
County Pa. C.P. 1969).
202. See Commonwealth ex rel. Chidsey v. Black, 363 Pa. 231, 69 A.2d 376 (1950).
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injunctive relief is clear since an injunction is prospective in nature,
thereby giving the Commonwealth the authority to stop the discharge and
then proceed to undertake reclamation activities.
Presuming that the Commonwealth could actually establish a nuisance
under the Act, the operative question is not the availability of injunctive
relief, but rather the proper form of injunctive relief. The Act provides
that in cases where there is a danger to the public health a mandatory
preliminary injunction may be issued.2 0 3 The appropriateness and necessity for such relief is obvious when consideration is given to the need to
protect the citizenry from diseases that may be present in the water
resulting from municipal sewage disposal or industrial wastes such as
mercury or acidic compounds. In all other cases, the court, by decree,
will assess what it deems to be a reasonable time within which such nuisance shall be abated.20 4 Although the latter procedure is appealing because of its equitable nature, it seems to have certain shortcomings when
viewed in the context of the total regulatory scheme. The Act, which
has been in existence since 1937, has consistently stated that persons
"shall not discharge" pollutants into the waters of the Commonwealth.
It is clear that all parties are aware of the steps that must be taken to
meet the responsibility placed upon them, and there has been ample time
to initiate and complete the construction of the facilities necessary to
meet the requirements of the Act. Moreover, the propriety of the decree
of the court seems to be even more questionable where the party has been
under the jurisdiction of the Department of Environmental Resources
and an order has been issued to comply with the provisions of the Act
or the rules and regulations established thereunder. In this case, a "reasonable time" for the abatement of the problem has been established by
the Department, and any further "grace period" that may be given to the
party would seem to be contrary to the policy of the Act which indicates
the need for immediate and decisive action by all parties. This is not to
say that in a case where the party has not been operating under a permit
or order or where the condition has just arisen that a decree of the court
granting a "reasonable amount of time" would not be appropriate, since
this party must be given time. However, when a party has consistently
and blatantly violated the Act, additional time would not seem to provide
the impetus that would cause the party to take steps toward abatement.
Notwithstanding the form of relief which the court may grant pursuant to the Act, it may enforce orders through its general contempt
powers. If the party does not comply with the terms of the decree, the
court has the power to compel compliance through a fine in favor of the
Commonwealth for civil contempt. In Commonwealth ex rel. Carlin v.
Echo,20 5 the court determined that after an order had been issued pur-

suant to the abatement power granted to it under the Clean Streams Law,
203.
204.

tit. 35, § 691.601(b) (Supp. 1971).
tit. 35, § 691.601(a) (Supp. 1971).
205. 19 Bucks Co. L. Rptr. 110 (Bucks County Pa. C.P. 1969).
PA. STAT.
PA. STAT.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol16/iss5/4

32

Paul and Shepard: Statutory Pollution Control in Pennsylvania

MAY 1971]

COMMENTS

a willful and intentional violation of such order would constitute civil
contempt of court. In reaching this determination, the court reasoned
that although an injunction, granted at the request of an agency of the
Commonwealth, could be enforced through indirect criminal contempt, to
deny the court the power to enforce its decree through civil contempt
would be to disarm it of an effective tool through which it can force
compliance with its orders.206 The authority of the courts to enforce their
decree through civil contempt is clearly significant since the appropriate
fines for civil contempt may greatly exceed the fines that are permissible
under criminal contempt. With this fact in mind, it is clear that the
courts have an effective tool by which they can enforce their orders and
thereby force compliance with the Clean Streams Law.
Under the Act, a public official must institute a cause of action for
abatement of a nuisance.2 0 7 This declaration is consistent with the common law rule that only public officials may institute suits for a purely
public nuisance 208 since they are the only party that would fully protect
the public interest. Accordingly, private individuals do not have standing
20 9
While the Attorney General of the Commonto institute such a suit.

206. Id. at 114. See also Brocker v. Brocker, 429 Pa. 513, 241 A.2d 336 (1968) ;
Casco Products Corp. v. Hess Brothers, Inc., 184 Pa. Super. 47, 132 A.2d 922 (1957).
The distinction between civil and criminal contempt is at times obscure. The feature
distinguishing civil contempt from criminal contempt is the purpose of the proceeding
before the court. The dominant purpose of the contempt action determines whether
it is civil or criminal and it is criminal where the purpose is to protect the dignity
of the court; whereas it is civil where the purpose is to require or force compliance
with an outstanding court order. See generally Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass'n v.
International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 392 Pa. 500, 140 A.2d 814 (1958); Knaus v.
Knaus, 387 Pa. 370, 127 A.2d 669 (1956). In the case of a contempt proceeding
pursuant to an injunction under subsection .601 it is clear that the action is civil
since the purpose is to secure compliance with the order and the defendant can
relieve himself of the sanction if the court order is complied with.
If the foregoing rationale was not applicable to an injunction issued pursuant
to subsection .601, the court would only be able to use the minor indirect criminal
contempt, thereby disarming the court of the power necessary to force compliance.
Furthermore, if the court was forced to use criminal contempt, the defendant would
be guaranteed the procedural safeguards of notice of charges and the right to a jury
trial which are not guaranteed in a civil proceeding. See United States v. United
Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258 (1946) ; Bata v. Central Penn National
Bank, 433 Pa. 284, 249 A.2d 767 (1969).
207. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 691.601 (a) (Supp. 1971).
208. See Comment, The Use of Private Actions To Control Environmental Pollution in Pennsylvania, 16 VILL. L. REV. 920 (1971).
209. See Commonwealth ex rel. Shumaker v. New York & Pa. Co., 378 Pa. 359,
106 A.2d 239 (1954). The court in ruling that a private party could not institute a
suit stated:
In this case the interest of the Commonwealth as a whole, as well as the interest
of the residents of Clarion and Butler Counties is involved. There could be no
guarantee that private counsel would so conduct the litigation as to protect those
interests. The only persons obligated and empowered so to do were, and are,
the sworn public officials to whom the right to sue in the name of the Commonwealth is entrusted by the statute under which the proceeding was authorized
and instituted.
Id. at 367-68, 106 A.2d at 243. In Shumaker, a private attorney who had formerly
represented a sportsmans group attempted to institute an action on behalf of the
Commonwealth stating that they were assistant district attorneys. The court found
that the precise statutory procedure for the appointment of assistant district attorneys
and special assistants to the district attorneys were not complied with and that the
pertinent statutes did not authorize their appointment.
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210
wealth is given the primary authority for instituting abatement actions,
a district attorney of any county or a solicitor of any municipality may
21
bring such an action after notice has been given to the Attorney General. '
Moreover, to further streamline public official enforcement, the Act has
liberalized venue requirements by providing that the appropriate party
may institute an action to enjoin the nuisance in the Commonwealth Court,
in the Court of Common Pleas where the activity is taking place, where
the condition exists, or where the public is affected.2 12 This section takes
into consideration the not too infrequent situation where the activity is
taking place in one political subdivision of the Commonwealth, but the
actual injury is occurring in another, and gives the official a choice of
convenient forums.

2.

Judicially Imposed Penalties

The Clean Streams Law also provides that any person or municipality
who violates the Act, or any rule, regulation, or order pursuant thereto,
is guilty of a summary offense. 2 13 Each day on which such a violation
occurs is deemed to be a separate offense which may be prosecuted individually. 214 The proper authorities may institute a summary action before any magistrate, alderman, or justice of the peace in the county where
the offense occurs, where the condition is maintained, or where the public
is affected. Upon conviction, the party may be fined not less than $100
nor more than $1000.215 Thus, a single violation of the Act can potentially
210.

PA. STAT.

tit. 35, § 691.601 (Supp. 1971) ; Commonwealth ex rel. Shumaker

v. New York & Pa. Co., 367 Pa. 40, 79 A.2d 439 (1951).

211. Id. The district attorney or municipal solicitor must give the Attorney
General notice of their action so that he has the opportunity to exercise his high
prerogative to take over control of the case. See also Commonwealth ex rel. Minerd

v. Margiotti, 325 Pa. 17, 188 A. 524 (1936) ; PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 691.601 (Supp. 1971).
212. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 691.601(a) (Supp. 1971).

213. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 691.602(a) (Supp. 1971). See Commonwealth v. Ebersole,
59 Lanc. L. Rev. 363 (Lancaster County Pa. C.P. 1965). If the party fails to pay
the fine imposed, he may be subject to imprisonment for sixty days.
214. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 691.602(c) (Supp. 1971).
215. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 691.602(a) (Supp. 1971). Since the fine under this section
is potentially in the amount of $1000, there is some question as to the procedure required to prosecute these offenses. In the case of Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145
(1968), the United States Supreme Court held that the sixth amendment as applied to
the states through the fourteenth, requires that a defendant accused of a serious offense
be afforded the right to a trial by jury. The court then stated that an offense punishable by a $500 fine or six months in prison was a serious and not a petty offense and
the defendant was entitled to a trial by jury. See also Baldwin v. New York, 399
U.S. 66 (1970). Therefore, the penalty under the instant statute would require that
the defendant have the right to a trial by jury. This right is provided by statute under
Pennsylvania Law, see PA. STAT. tit. 42, § 725 (1966), wherein it is stated that a
defendant may upon his own motion request trial by a jury of six. Although, a
defendant in a criminal case is normally tried by a jury of twelve persons, the Supreme
Court case of Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970), held that a jury of six men
is valid. See generally Rogge, Williams v. Florida: End Of A Theory, 16 VILL. L.
REV. 411 (1971). Therefore, it seems that the penalty section of the Act is constitutional in that the defendant does have the right to a trial by jury.
The Clean Streams Law provides that if an appeal from a decision of an
alderman, magistrate, or justice of the peace is taken, the district attorney of the
County must represent the interest of Commonwealth. For appeal procedures from
the decisions of an alderman, justice of the peace, or magistrate, see PA. STAT. tit. 42,
§ 911 et seq. (1966).
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subject the party to a significant monetary loss which could have a deterrent effect on the party's pollution causing activities. To further this end,
it is provided that if a similar violation occurs within two years after a
conviction in a summary proceeding, the party is guilty of a misdemeanor
and may be fined not less than $100 nor more than $5000.216
3.

Administrative Enforcement Through Civil Penalties

The Clean Streams Law provides that in addition to a proceeding
for an injunction or a criminal penalty in a court of law, the Environmental Hearing Board, after a hearing,217 may assess a civil penalty upon
a violator. 218 The penalty assessed for violation, whether or not the con-

duct is willful, may be up to $10,000 plus $500 per day for continued
violations.2 19 This striking departure from the traditional principles of

judicial process, 220 could prove to be potentially one of the most effective
methods of enforcing the Act, although it is quite similar in nature to
criminal penalties. Since agency proceedings are more flexible, the Commonwealth would not have to confront the procedural problems that it
must contend with in a criminal proceeding. 221 First, since the Board is
an expert in the pollution area, it would seem that much credence would
be attributed to the technical evidence necessary to prove or disprove a
violation. Second, while the Act specifically states that in determining
the amount of the penalty the Department may consider the willfulness
of the violation, the damage or injury to the waters of the Commonwealth,
and the cost of restoration, since the latter two elements are particularly
within the Department's expertise, it would seem that their findings in
222
this regard would be almost conclusive.
Although this procedure does not have the same effect as injunctive
relief, i.e., abatement of the pollution, it could be much more effective
216. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 691.602 (Supp. 1971). The Act further provides that the
party may be subject to imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one year.
Although this punishment could place a stigma on the "crime," it is seldom used in
regulatory offenses. See Kovel, A Case For Civil Penalties: Air Pollution Control,
46 J. URBAN LAW 153 (1969) ; Watkins, The Electrical Equipment Anti-Trust Cases:
Their Implications for Government and for Business, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 97. 100 (1961).
217. A hearing would assure the parties minimum due process requirements, since
the hearing would have to be held in compliance with the terms of the Administrative
Code. PA. STAT. tit. 71, § 1710.1 et seq. (1962), as amended (Supp. 1971).
218. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 691.605 (Supp. 1971).
219. Id. The Act further provides that all civil fines assessed and not paid, as well
as the interest and costs accrued thereon, shall become a lien in favor of the Commonwealth upon the real or personal property of the violator.
220. Although this is a striking departure from traditional practice in Pennsylvania,
it is not an isolated example. It is clear that an administrative agency cannot impose
criminal sanction, see United States v. Louisville & N. R.R., 176 F. 942 (D.C. Ala.
1910); Schwenk, The Administrative Crime, 42 MICH. L. REV. 51 (1943), however,
they may constitutionally assess and collect civil penalties. See Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320 (1908) ; K. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 3.11

(1958) ; Kovel, supra note 216, at 162--64; McKay, Sanction in Motion: The Administrative Process,49 IOWA L. REV. 441 (1964).

221. See Kovel, supra note 216, at 153-58.
222. It is arguable that past violations of the Act could be admitted into evidence
in this type of proceeding, whereas, this evidence is not admissible in a criminal trial.
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than the present criminal sanctions since the amount of the fine can be
much greater. One method that might be employed that could have the
same effect as injunctive relief is to revise the Act to grant the Environmental Hearing Board the authority to rebate the fine if the violator
corrects the condition within a reasonable amount of time as determined
by the Board. Although the civil penalties are clearly more appropriate
to punish violators, they do not have the built-in coercive element that
will force abatement and future control. If the Board were granted the
aforementioned power, there would clearly be an incentive for all violators
to correct the condition and have their fines returned and, perhaps, employed toward the costs of their pollution control efforts. This approach
would also add the element of conciliation to the present procedure, thereby giving the Department the bargaining power necessary to force some
polluters to comply with the pollution laws. Moreover, this approach
would alleviate the time consuming and costly procedural rules attending
injunctive relief. Under the present system, if the Department secures
an injunction and the polluter fails to comply within the time specified
in the order, the Department must go back into court and ask that the
polluter be held in contempt of the order. Furthermore, additional time
is wasted if the Department seeks damages since it must go through the
cumbersome task of proving that the sanction of civil contempt is appropriate. The suggested system would avoid these procedures since the
Department would have the fine from the beginning of the action thus
making further proceedings unnecessary in the event that the violator
does not comply with the order.
4.

Clean Water Fund

The Clean Streams Law provides for the establishment of the Clean
Water Fund to be administered by the Department for the express purpose of eliminating pollution. 2S The liquidity of the Fund is provided in
two ways. First, all fines collected by a court under the penal section of
the Act, and all civil penalties assessed and collected by the Department,
go into the fund. 224 Second, the Department may accept payments to the

Fund in lieu of requiring a party who is discharging contrary to the
terms of the Act to construct a treatment facility.2 25 In determining the

proper amount of the payment, the Department evaluates the cost of constructing a treatment facility as well as the quantity and quality of the
discharge, and the effect the discharge will have on the water if permitted
to continue. The Department, pursuant to the rules and regulations of
the Environmental Hearing Board may accept such payment only where it
determines that: (1) the payments will provide a greater benefit to the
223. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 691.8(a) (Supp. 1971).
224. Id. The payment of fines into this Fund could be a valid reason for maintaining the penalty sections of the Act.
225. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 691.8(b) (Supp. 1971).
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Commonwealth; (2) they would more appropriately conform to the policy
of the Act than the construction of treatment facilities;226 and (3) the
continuation of such a discharge will not affect other treatment programs
227

in the area.

The importance of the Clean Water Fund rests in its purpose which
is to provide funds for abatement programs, or for the construction of
consolidated treatment facilities in an area where a permittee is discharging. 22 8

Under this program, the Commonwealth now has an effective

means by which it can commence activities to aid depressed areas. But,
even more important, the authority to take payments into the Fund can
be used where a number of small industries or municipalities are consolidated in one area and the parties are not able to construct facilities
independently. Although the Commonwealth has authority to aid depressed areas under the Land and Water Conservation and Reclamation
Act,2 29 the Clean Water Fund could potentially act as a supplement to
any program undertaken pursuant to that Act so that effective pollution
control activities may be initiated.
5.

Administrative Enforcement Of The Clean Streams Law
a.

Withholding Permits

The Department is given the authority to indirectly enforce the Act,
and at the same time avoid future violations by withholding a permit to
discharge any substance into a watercourse. If the Department finds that
the applicant is in violation of the Act or any rule, regulation, or order
of the Department and that such violation shows a lack of intention or
ability on the part of the applicant to comply with the permit, the Board
is vested with the authority to refuse to grant a permit. 230 Since the
power to withhold a permit is purely a matter of discretion, it is not mandatory that an applicant be denied a permit if he is in fact in violation of
the Act. If the Department determines that it is in the best interest of
the Commonwealth to withhold a permit it must take steps to inform the
applicant of its decision and afford him the opportunity of a hearing. At
such hearing the applicant may bring forth evidence to convince the
Department of its intention and ability to comply with the terms of the
permit. If the Department is convinced, it may issue the permit, notwithstanding the other violations. Thus, the Department, in its discretion,
may weigh the evidence to determine if the interest of the Commonwealth
226. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 691.8(b) (1) (Supp. 1971).
227. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 691.8(b) (4) (Supp. 1971). The Department is granted
the power to impose conditions which the premittee must comply with when payments
to the Fund are accepted. This power includes the authority to establish procedures

for the cessation of the operation which is of great importance in the area of mine
drainage. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 691.8(b) (3) (Supp. 1971).
228. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 691.8(b) (5) (Supp. 1971).
229. PA. STAT. tit. 32, § 1501 et seq. (Supp. 1971).
230. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 691.609 (Supp. 1971).
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will be advanced by denying a permit, while at the same time considering
the fairness to the applicant.
Before the enactment of this section, the Department was forced to
issue a permit, as long as the applicant's plans, if followed, would be satisfactory to avoid the destruction of a waterway. 231 It was not allowed to
take into consideration other violations of the Act which would indicate
the applicant's lack of intent to comply with the new permit, or its financial
inability to do so. 232 The Department had to issue the permit even
though the chances were very good that when the applicant's operation
started, it would result in pollution. Now, however, the Department may
consider the other violations and thus make a more informed decision
concerning the protection of the waters of the Commonwealth. This new
provision can have a two-fold effect. First, if the applicant is aware that
the Department can consider the other violations he will be indirectly
coerced into complying with other permits that may be issued to him and
also with the general provisions of the Act and the rules and regulations.
Second, if the Department decides to deny the permit, its decision could
add to the total effort toward preventing and controlling pollution since
without a permit the party could not carry on the regulated activity.
Denial of a permit would have the further effect of preventing many potential pollution-creating activities from ever reaching fruition. This aspect
of the new provision could have its greatest impact where the applicant
has consistently shown a lack of good faith in complying with the Act.
b.

Enforcement Orders

The Department may also enforce the Act through the use of enforcement orders, thereby avoiding immediate recourse to the judiciary. If
the Department finds that an operation in or on the party's land is causing
or creating a danger of pollution, or is violating the Act or any rule or
regulation thereunder, it may issue an enforcement order requiring the
party to cease its operation or it may modify, suspend or revoke any outstanding permit. 233 With this broad range of powers the Department
can enforce the provisions of the Act effectively and with the rapidity
needed to avoid danger to the waters of the Commonwealth. First, the
Department has the authority to confront situations which it deems detri231. See Sanitary Water Bd. v. Sunbeam Coal Corp., 91 Dauph. Co. Rptr. 70
(Dauphin County Pa. C.P. 1969). In Sunbeam, the court ruled that the Sanitary
Water Board could not deny an applicant a coal mining permit on the basis that it

was in violation of prior permits. The court stated that the Board's powers were
limited to a review of the drainage plans of an applicant and instituting criminal proceedings, and it was not within its authority to deny a permit if the applicant's plans
for the operation of the mine in question were adequate to control pollution. This
view was fortified by the reasoning that to hold otherwise would make the mine
operator an insurer of pure water in the area for all time. In response to this type
of analysis the legislature passed subsection .609. It is now clear that past violations
of the Act may be considered, thereby giving the Department a great deal of discretion in determining if the permit should be issued.
232. Id.
233. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 691.610 (Supp. 1971).
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mental to the purity of the waters which are not specifically covered by
the terms of the Act. Second, if the party is violating the Act or a rule,
regulation or order promulgated thereunder, the Department can issue
an enforcement order to compel the party to comply with the Act or rule
without going through judicial channels.
The Department's power to issue such enforcement orders is only
limited if the order affects an operation not directly related to the violation. In this situation the Department can only issue an order if it is
determined that the other enforcement provisions, i.e., injunctions or
penalties, are not adequate to control the situation. Therefore, an order
of this nature can only be issued if there is an immediate threat of pollution and the other remedies would take too long to secure, or, as in the
case of penalties, other remedies will not cure the problem.
If an enforcement order is issued the party has a right to appeal to
the Hearing Board.23 4 During the appeal, however, the order remains
effective on notice and until a final hearing unless the Board determines
that the appeal will act to stay the order. 235 This provision is of particular importance since if the appeal did act to stay the enforcement
order the effectiveness of the order would be severely limited.
6.

Other Means to Abate Pollution

The Clean Streams Law makes it clear that the Commonwealth is
not estopped from proceeding to abate the pollution of a watercourse
under any other existing authority for the abatement of a nuisance. Thus,
proceeding under the Act is not the exclusive means by which pollution
may be abated or the polluter punished. 236 An agent of the Commonwealth may therefore proceed to abate pollution under the traditional
approach of common law public nuisance. In the case of Commonwealth
ex rel. Shumaker v. New York & Pennsylvania Co., 237 the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court made it clear that the courts have jurisdiction over such
234. Id. All proceedings before the Hearing Board are controlled by the Administrative Agency Law, PA. STAT. tit. 71, § 1710.1 et seq. (1962), as amended (Supp.
1971). If a party is aggrieved by a ruling of the Hearing Board, he has a right to
judicial review of that ruling before the newly created Commonwealth Court. PA.
STAT. tit. 71, § 1710.41 (1962). Review of these matters was formerly performed by
the Dauphin County Court. However, the creation of the Commonwealth Court,
PA. STAT. tit. 17, §§ 5211 et seq. (Supp. 1971), has now shifted the responsibility
to it, PA. STAT. tit. 17, § 211.14(60) (Supp. 1971). The ruling of the Board will
only be reversed by a court where there is abuse of discretion by the Board, i.e., if
the findings are not supported by substantial evidence. PA. STAT. tit. 71, § 1710.44
(1962). See generally Sanitary Water Bd. v. Mico Enterprises, Inc., 84 Dauph. Co.
Rep. 111 (Dauphin County Pa. C.P. 1965) ; Sanitary Water Bd. v. Coudersport, 81
Dauph. Co. Rep. 178 (Dauphin County Pa. C.P. 1963) ; Sanitary Water Bd. v. West
Kittanning, 80 Dauph. Co. Rep. 257 (Dauphin County Pa. C.P. 1963) ; Sanitary Water
Bd. v. New Oxford Municipal Auth., 79 Dauph. Co. Rep. 316 (Dauphin County Pa.
C.P. 1962); Sanitary Water Bd. v. Sunbeam Coal Corp., 77 Dauph. Co. Rep. 264
(Dauphin County Pa. C.P. 1961).
235. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 691.610 (Supp. 1971).
236. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 691.701 (1964). See Commonwealth ex rel. Shumaker v.
New York & Pa. Co., 367 Pa. 40, 79 A.2d 439 (1951) ; Commonwealth ex rel.
Chidsey v. Black, 363 Pa. 231, 69 A.2d 376 (1950).
237. 367 Pa. 40, 79 A.2d 439 (1951).
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a cause of action2 38 and a public official could proceed to abate a nuisance
without relying on the Clean Streams Law 2 39 or waiting for the Department to take action. 240 This holding was deemed to be in the public
interest because of the grave menace to health, welfare and comfort of
the public arising from the corruption of waters. Thus, the Clean Streams
Law does not restrict the common law right to abate pollution through
the action of a public official or a private individual suing under the
2 41
private nuisance theory.
The Act also makes it clear that the terms for the abatement of a
nuisance in no way abridge or alter the propriety of attacking pollution
under the other statutes. 242 Hence, the Commonwealth can proceed to
abate water pollution from the disposal of solid waste under the Solid
Waste Management Act. 243 Furthermore, a public official could abate
a nuisance under the public nuisance section of the Penal Code. 2 44 Alternatively, the Commonwealth may also proceed to attack pollution under
2 45
the Fish Law.
Of all the alternative remedies available, proceeding under the Fish
Law may be the most significant. Beside providing for a fine, 24 6 this
statute gives the Commonwealth the option of instituting a civil suit to collect damages assessible for the loss of aquatic life whether or not the acts
of the polluter were willful. 2 4 7

Under this statute, the Commonwealth

could proceed to seek compensation for the actual money damage suffered
as a result of the loss of aquatic life, whereas, under the other alternative
remedies it is limited to fines. Thus, if the watercourse is to be reclaimed,
it can be done at the expense of the party who caused the damage.
V.

PROPOSALS

While the preceding has attempted to analyze the Commonwealth's
pollution control laws with a critical eye, it is submitted that two glaring
238. Id. at 53, 79 A.2d at 446.
239. Id. at 50-52, 79 A.2d at 445-46. See also Commonwealth ex rel. Chidsey v.
Black, 363 Pa. 231, 69 A.2d 376 (1950).
240. 367 Pa. 52, 79 A.2d 446.
241. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 691.701 (1964). See Comment, supra note 208.
242. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 691.701 (1964).
243. PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 6001 et seq. (Supp. 1971). Under this act storage and
disposal of garbage and other discarded material is controlled on the private and
municipal level. The disposal of solid waste material presents a grave danger to the
purity of a watercourse because of the impurity that may discharge from a disposal
area. The Act prohibits the dumping of any solid waste on the surface of the ground,
into the waters of the Commonwealth, or disposing of solid wastes by dumping the
same into mines without a permit. A violation of the Act subjects the violator to a
fine of not more than $300 if he is found guilty in a summary proceeding.
244. PA. STAT. tit. 18, § 4612 (1963). This section states that anyone who establishes, maintains or continues a public or common nuisance is guilty of a misdemeanor
and may be fined up to $500. If the nuisance is in existence at the time of the suit,
the court may order it abated.
245. PA. STAT. tit. 30, § 200 et seq. (Supp. 1971).
246. PA. STAT. tit. 30, § 202 (Supp. 1971). The polluter may be fined not less
than $100 nor more than $1000 upon conviction as provided by law. See PA. STAT.
tit. 30, § 270 et seq. (Supp. 1971).
247. PA. STAT. tit. 30, § 202.1 (Supp. 1971).
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inadequacies exist which necessitate legislative correction at the earliest
opportunity to insure an effective pollution control program.
A.

Judicially Imposed Civil Fines

The use of penal sanctions as a deterrent to air pollution is of questionable value. In the first place penal sanctions do not prevent future
pollution, they only punish past activities. It is doubtful whether the
248
Furtherpenal sanction will ever be employed to incarcerate a polluter.
more, as one commentator has pointed out, the imposition of the small
fines provided for under the pollution control Acts "can only increase
the cost of production - a special service charge that may be cheaper than
the cost of pollution control for the offender.

249

The civil penalty approach offers several distinct advantages over
criminal penal sanctions. First, the specific pleading and strict venue
requirements attending criminal proceedings make civil proceedings much
more flexible.250 Moreover, under the civil penalty approach the traditional delaying tactics such as failure of the defendant to appear would
no longer stop the judicial process since in a civil proceeding it is not
necessary that the defendant be present. 251 Furthermore, the Commonwealth would not have to produce its witness, since depositions of the
inspectors would be admissible to prove the case.25 2 It is suggested,
therefore, that this approach be adopted to add the necessary flexibility
to the enforcement machinery. Penal sanctions might very well remain
along with a civil fine in the event there should be flagrant contempt for
the regulatory scheme. If this should occur, the stigma of criminality
would be well deserved. This is not to unqualifiedly state that conviction
for a misdemeanor will have no deterrent effect. However, while unfavorable publicity may cause some violators to comply with the law, it is
submitted that those industries which do not come into direct contact
with the public, as for example the steel industry, will not suffer from a
newspaper account citing the company for a pollution violation.
248. Research has failed to discover a single case in which a polluter was incar-

cerated for violations of the Commonwealth's air pollution laws. Furthermore, analogy
to the Federal Anti-Trust Laws, 15 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1964), which also provide
for penal sanctions, shows the frequency with which such sanctions have been employed. The simple fact is that penal sanctions have hardly ever been used to deter
"white collar" crimes, of which air pollution can now be included. See generally
Watkins, Electrical Equipment Antitrust Cases - Their Implications for Government and for Business, 29 U. CHI. L. REv. 97 (1961) ; Koval, note 216 supra.
249. Walker, Enforcement of Performance Requirements With Injunctive Procedure, 10 ARIZ. L. REV. 81, 87 (1968).
250. See generally Comment, supra note 249.
251. See Koval, supra note 216, at 157. This is not to suggest that these fines
should always be issued ex parte since, as a matter of fundamental fairness, the defendant should always be given the opportunity to be heard. The fact that the defendant
does not have to be present, however, could prove very useful especially where there
are habitual violators who use their failure to appear as a delaying technique.
252. The defendant is not being deprive of his sixth amendment rights since the
judgment does not involve the personal safety of the defendant, thus the witness is not
one against the accused in the criminal sense. See Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers
Union v. McElrey, 367 U.S. 886 (1961) ; United States v. Zucker, 161 U.S. 475 (1896).
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A second argument against penal sanctions is the fact that the
criminal law process is unnecessarily cumbersome thus permitting many
violators to go free without any progress being made towards curing the
pollution problem. Although some type of sanction is necessary for the
enforcement of the pollution control laws, the penal sanction does not
seem to be the most appropriate one to further the goals of the Acts. The
use of civil fines, however, which are indistinguishable in force, could
prove to be an effective tool for pollution control.

B. Private Remedies
Enforcement of the Air Pollution Control Act and the Clean Streams
Law is exclusively within the purview of the state agency. Although a
private individual can bring to the attention of the Department a possible
violation of the pollution laws, 253 he cannot himself bring a private suit
to enforce the same. Therefore, a private party's only recourse to relief from air or water pollution is in the initiation of a private nuisance
action. 254 One of the disadvantages of not permitting private parties
to institute actions under the Commonwealth's pollution control laws
rests with the difficulties inherent in the private nuisance action. 255 Moreover, should the private party's complaint allege injury resulting from a
public nuisance, before he can secure relief for such injury he must show
that the injury is special or peculiar to him and is not shared by the entire public. Because of the wide proliferation of air and water pollution,
256
this may prove to be very difficult.
The State of Michigan recently passed legislation permitting a private
individual to maintain an action under the state's pollution control laws. 2517
Legislation of this type is beneficial since it permits action against polluters, who, because of agency understaffing, or an agency determination
that such pollution is too insignificant to warrant official attention, would
necessarily remain unchallenged. Furthermore, the realities of political
pressure should not be underestimated. Whereas agency action could
conceivably be halted because of political partisanship, citizen suits would
not discriminate when prosecuting a polluter.
253. See pp. 860-62 supra.
254. The Air Pollution Control Act, PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 4012.1 (Supp. 1971),
preserves private nuisance actions and remedies although the same also constitute
"air pollution." In Brookhaven v. American Rendering, Inc., 434 Pa. 290, 256 A.2d
626 (1969), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania replied to the argument raised by
the defense that the Air Pollution Control Act pre-empted private nuisance actions
by stating: "[i]t is now clear that equity jurisdiction attaches to restrain a public or
private nuisance caused by air pollution." Id. at 292, 256 A.2d at 627.
255. See Comment, The Use of Private Actions to Control Environmental Pollution in Pennsylvania, 16 VILL. L. REV. 920 (1971).

256. Id. at 929. See also Comment, Equity and the Eco-System: Can Injunctions
Clear the Air, 68 Mica. L. REV. 1254 (1970).
257. MicH. Comp. LAWS § 691.1201 (Supp. 1971). The Federal Air Pollution
Control Act provides for similar private relief. See text accompanying note 261 infra.
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Identical legislation has recently been introduced in the Pennsylvania
General Assembly. 258 It would authorize citizen suits in the name of the
Commonwealth against the state, any instrumentality or agency of the
state, political subdivision, person, partnership or corporation for "the
protection of the air, water and other natural resources of the State from
pollution, impairment or destruction or for the protection of the public
trust in the natural resources of the State." 259 The proposed bill authorizes
the courts to grant temporary and permanent equitable relief or impose
conditions on the defendant which will insure protection of the air and
26 0
water from pollution.
A question arises whether a citizen can compel an administrative
official to institute proceedings against an alleged polluter under the pollution control laws, other state statutes, or a current court doctrine. It
seems quite clear that no such right exists under the air or water pollution control acts since they are silent on this point. The recent federal
air pollution law, 26 1 however, squarely focuses upon this question by expressly providing a citizen with the power to compel an official to perform
262
a "duty" under the pollution law.

One theory which has been forwarded to uphold such action, in the
absence of specific language in the acts, is premised upon the public trust
doctrine. In essence, this theory argues that certain environmental rights
are held in common by the public and since the government is the trustee
of this public interest, it is its duty to uphold that interest in good faith.
One approach to insure compliance with this duty would be to permit
private citizens to maintain mandamus actions against administrative
officials to compel them to perform their statutory duty to initiate actions
against polluters. 263 The difficulty inherent in such actions is the traditional rule that mandamus will issue only to compel administrative action
that is ministerial and not discretionary. However, the doctrine has been
effectively employed in the pollution area in at least one instance, 264 and
its use could be expanded.
258. H.R. 400, General Assembly of Pennsylvania (1971 Sess.)
H.R. 400].

[hereinafter

259. H.R. 400, § 2 (1971 Sess.).
260. H.R. 400, § 5(a) (1971 Sess.).

261. 1970 Amendments to the Clean Air Act, § 304, 1970 U.S.

CODE CONG.

NEWS 6947.

& AD.

262. Id.
263. The Pennsylvania Air Pollution Control Act states:
The Department shall have power and its duty shall be to(3) Receive and initiate complaints of air pollution ...
(4.1) Issue orders to any person causing air pollution. ...
(7) Institute prosecutions under this act.
PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 4004 (Supp. 1971) (emphasis added).
264. See Comment, supra note 256, at 1272-73; Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine
In Natural Resources Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MIcH. L. Rlv. 471
(1970).
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CONCLUSION

In conclusion, it seems clear that the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
has an adequate legislative foundation from which effective work can be
done to effectuate the abatement and prevention of present and future air
and water pollution. There is, however, a crucial problem remaining in
the area of pollution control and adequate legislation is only the first step
in creating a unified effort by the Commonwealth, municipalities, industries, and landowners toward attaining the ultimate goal of clean air and
water. The Commonwealth must proceed to implement every phase of the
Air Pollution Control Act and the Clean Streams Law immediately, while
the other parties make every effort to "voluntarily" comply with their
terms. If this unified attempt is carried forward to meet the challenge,
perhaps the goal of pollution-free air and water may be achieved.
Edward R. Paul
Michael J. Shepard
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